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Abstract
Many of the issues that are today part of the discussions surrounding international 
investment agreements were fĳirst dealt with when governments sought to negotiate a 
United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (and various related 
instruments) almost 40 years ago. The Code was meant to establish a multilateral 
framework to defĳine, in a balanced manner, the rights and responsibilities of transna-
tional corporations and host country governments in their relations with each other. 
This article looks at the origins of these negotiations, the underlying interest situations 
of the participating country groups, the experience of related negotiations, the actual 
negotiations of the Code, the reasons for the failure of the negotiations, the current 
situation, and factors driving change. The article concludes with lessons learned from 
the Code and related negotiations. These lessons may be of interest to current effforts 
to improve the international investment law and policy regime.
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What rules should govern the behavior of transnational corporations (TNCs) 
in the countries in which they are established, and what rules should govern 
the treatment of these fĳirms by the governments of host countries? This chal-
lenge has been on the international agenda since the end of World War II. 
However, it was only in the late 1970s that negotiators began to formulate a 
comprehensive multilateral instrument, the United Nations Code of Conduct 
on Transnational Corporations, to tackle this challenge. In parallel to these 
negotiations (and subsequent to them), negotiations were also undertaken on 
specifĳic aspects of the activities of TNCs, the principal private actors in inter-
national economic relations and important forces in individual economies. 
Although the Code negotiations – serviced by the United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) – came to naught, they crystallized the 
basic interest situations of the principal stakeholders and key issues associated 
with them, and they laid bare a number of the obstacles that governments 
seeking a multilateral investment instrument need to overcome. Many of these 
are still with us today and await an international solution.
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1 Through Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution 1908 (LVII) of 2 August 1974. The 
Commission on Transnational Corporations was subsequently established through ECOSOC 
resolution 1913 (LVII) of 5 December 1974. See Sotirios Mousouris, ‘Transnationals in the UN 
Spotlight: The Beginning’ in Khalil Hamdani and Lorraine Rufffĳing (eds), The United Nations 
Centre on Transnational Corporations: Corporate Conduct and the Public Interest (Routledge, 
forthcoming) (Mousouris was one of the stafff directly involved in the establishment of 
UNCTC and the Commission and became UNCTC’s Assistant Director, Policy Analysis 
Division, 1975–1981; he was the Secretary of the Working Group on a Code of Conduct and, 
in that capacity, the principal UNCTC stafff dealing with the Code negotiations); Khalil 
Hamdani, ‘The UNCTC: Origins, History and Legacy’ in Hamdani and Rufffĳing, ibid, ch 1. For a 
description and analysis of UNCTC’s work (and, in some cases, subsequent work by UNCTAD) 
on international investment, see Hamdani and Rufffĳing, ibid; Tagi Sagafĳi-nejad in collabora-
tion with John H. Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From Code of Conduct 
to Global Compact (Indiana University Press 2008); Sidney Dell, The United Nations and 
International Business (Duke University Press 1990) (Dell was UNCTC’s Executive Director, 
1983–1984); Theodore H Moran, ‘The United Nations and Transnational Corporations: 
A review and a Perspective’ (2009) 18 Transnational Corporations 91–112; John H Dunning, 
Seasons of a Scholar: Some Reflections of an International Business Economist (Edward Elgar 
2009) passim; Torbjoern Fredriksson, ‘Forty Years of UNCTAD Research on FDI’ (2003) 12 
Transantional Corporations 1–39.
2 ITT’s interference was subject to Hearings in the United States Congress, in the Church 
Committee; see <http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports 
_vol7.htm> accessed 15 September 2014.
3 See address Salvador Allende, President of the Republic of Chile, UN General Assembly, 
Twenty-Seventh Session, 4 December 1972, UN Doc A/PV.2096.
1 The Beginning
UNCTC became operational on 1 November 1975 on the basis of a resolution of 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council, adopted in 1974.1 It was a 
time when the international community had just ‘discovered’ how important 
TNCs (fĳirms that control productive assets abroad) had become through their 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The trigger was ITT’s interference in Chile’s 
domestic policy, which eventually contributed to the overthrow of President 
Salvador Allende and politicized the issue further.2 President Allende drew 
attention to this interference in a speech in the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1972 and galvanized the international community to take action to 
address, and check, the ‘economic power, political influence and corrupting 
action’ of TNCs.3 But the issue was broader: TNCs were seen as having a sub-
stantial impact on individual national economies and international economic 
relations, and there was widespread suspicion that – given the global profĳit-
maximizing strategies of TNCs versus the national development objectives of 
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4 Annexes to the report of the second session of the Commission on Transnational Corporations 
contain lists of concerns regarding the activities of these fĳirms as they were seen at that time; 
many of these concerns were subsequently addressed in the Code negotiations. See 
Commission on Transnational Corporations, ‘Report on the Second Session 1–12 March 1976’ 
(E/5782 ECOSOC Offfĳicial Records: Sixty-First Session, Supplement No 5). For a broader dis-
cussion, see eg Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Mueller, Global Reach: The Power of the 
Multinational Corporations (Simon and Schuster 1974).
5 Foreign Policy (Spring 1974) 84–90.
6 See Stephen J Kobrin, ‘Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in LDCs: Trends 
from 1960 to 1979’ (1984) 28 ISQ 329–334.
7 The non-aligned countries, as well as the Group of 77, organized numerous meetings to 
enhance economic cooperation among them. See Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P Sauvant 
(eds), The Third World Without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned 
Countries (OCEANA 1978–1993) vols 12.; Karl P Sauvant and Joachim W Mueller (eds), The 
Third World without Superpowers, Second Series: The Group of 77 (OCEANA 1981–1995) vols 20. 
However, as shown by subsequent developments, there is a diffference between intentions 
and implementation. For a critical discussion, see Marjan Svetlicic, ‘Economic Cooperation 
Among Developing Countries: Business Activity and/or Politics?’ (1986) 2 Development & 
South-South Cooperation 49–66 (Svetlicic was (1977–1991) Senior Research Associate at the 
Research Centre for Cooperation with Developing Countries, Ljubljana, during the time the 
Code was negotiated; he represented Yugoslavia on the Commission during 1978–1984 and, 
throughout the period, was consulted by the government in his capacity as expert on MNEs 
and FDI).
governments – this impact was negative in terms of the distribution of benefĳits 
and the ability of indigenous fĳirms to grow and prosper.4
Around the same time, most developing countries had emerged from colo-
nialism, consolidated their independence, had become members of the United 
Nations, and began to assert themselves in international fora. A number of 
them also discovered their bargaining power, especially the oil exporting coun-
tries organized in Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
reflected in the actions they took in 1973. Other developing countries possess-
ing natural resources in demand in world markets also thought that they could 
assert themselves by organizing themselves in producer cartels. This possibil-
ity was discussed in an influential article by Fred Bergsten, published in Foreign 
Policy in 1974, entitled ‘One, two, many OPECs … ? The threat is real.’5 
Nationalizations reached their peak in the early 1970s.6 Moreover, develop-
ing  countries sought to enhance their bargaining position through import- 
substitution strategies and by cooperating more in the economic area, in the 
framework of the concept of ‘economic cooperation among developing coun-
tries.’7 Developing countries saw themselves in the ascendancy.
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8 The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order asked for, 
among other things, the ‘[r]egulation and supervision of the activities of transnational cor-
porations by taking measures in the interest of the national economies of the countries 
where such transnational corporations operate on the basis of the full sovereignty 
of those countries.’ See <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/ 
3201(S-VI)> accessed 15 September 2014. The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order stated that ‘[a]ll effforts should be made to formulate, 
adopt and implement an international code of conduct for transnational corporations.’ 
See <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3202(S-VI)> accessed 
15 September 2014. Both NIEO resolutions were adopted without a vote; however, a number 
of developed countries registered strong reservations. It should be noted, though, that there 
was always a diffference between the rhetoric of governments in international organizations 
and what governments did at the national level: countries continued to admit FDI, although 
they could have unilaterally restricted it.
9 When the United Nations began work in this area, the fĳirms involved were called ‘multina-
tional corporations.’ See eg United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development 
(United Nations, 1973) (the fĳirst major report on this subject by the United Nations). The 
Group of Eminent Persons, in its report, noted in a footnote: ‘There is general agreement in 
the Group that the word “enterprise” should be substituted for corporations, and a strong 
feeling that the word transnational would better convey the notion that these fĳirms operate 
from their home bases across national borders.’ See ‘Report of the Group of Eminent Persons 
to Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International 
Relations’ in United Nations, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and 
International Relations (United Nations 1974) 25. However, the Report of the Group on 
Eminent Person continued to use ‘multinational corporation’ in conformity with Economic 
and Social Council resolution 1721 (LIII) ibid.
When delegates debated the issue in the United Nations, three points were made: (1) the 
description ‘multinational’ was seen to imply that the fĳirms involved were owned or con-
trolled by citizens of various nations, while in reality the overwhelming majority of them 
were owned and controlled by citizens of one country, the home country; (2) the socialist 
countries preferred the term ‘corporation’ as opposed to ‘enterprise’, as the latter would have 
included their fĳirms controlling assets abroad, while they did not have fĳirms that were incor-
porated, and hence would not be covered, in their interpretation, by the term ‘multinational/
transnational corporation’ (interview with Kari Tapiola Special Assistant to the Executive 
Director (Klaus A Sahlgren) in UNCTC (1976–1978); General Secretary of the Trade Union 
Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC), 1978–1985; and Expert-Adviser (1978–1990), 
while International Afffairs Director of the Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions 
The confluence of these factors was reflected in the drive of the developing 
countries, supported by the socialist countries, to establish a New Interna-
tional  Economic Order (NIEO). The two NIEO resolutions, adopted during 
the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974,8 
made explicit reference to the need to regulate TNCs,9 as did the Charter of 
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(1985–1996) and in these capacities participated in the Code negotiations) and Stephen 
Pursey (who was Head of the ICFTU Economic and Policy Department when he partici-
pated in the Code negotiations), 8 January 2014); (3) at that time, the Andean Pact had 
adopted an agreement that foresaw the creation of ‘Andean multinational enterprises’, 
owned and controlled by various members of the Andean Pact countries (see Andean 
Code on Multinational Enterprises and the Regulations with regard to Subregional 
Capital (1972) 11 International Legal Materials 357–372). To take these considerations into 
account and to avoid any confusion between the ‘good’ Andean Pact enterprises and fĳirms 
headquartered elsewhere, delegates decided to change the terminology from ‘multina-
tional corporation’ to ‘transnational corporation’: this term has been used in the United 
Nations since then. However, this change in terminology did not take into account that a 
number of fĳirms operating transnationally are not incorporated and that, therefore, a 
more accurate label would have been ‘transnational enterprise.’ The non-aligned coun-
tries, in their own work on these enterprises, used the term ‘multinational enterprise’ and 
sought to promote the establishment of such fĳirms as joint ventures among themselves, 
partly in the framework of a ‘self-reliance’ concept. See eg ‘Report on a Meeting of the 
Group of Fisheries Experts of Non-Aligned Countries on the Establishment of 
Multinational Fisheries Enterprises’, (Colombo 15–16 July 1982) (exploring the possibility 
of establishing joint ventures in this area); see Jankowitsch and Sauvant (n 7) vol X 
410–412.
10 See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (A/RES/29/3281) <http://www 
.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3281(XXIX)&Lang=E&Area 
=RESOLUTION> accessed 29 September 2014. Six developed countries voted against this 
resolution, and ten countries abstained.
11 This is not to say that this issue had not been on the international agenda before: imme-
diately after World War II, an efffort had been made to address some aspects of interna-
tional investment in the framework of the aborted Havana Charter for an International 
Trade Organization. See also General Assembly resolution No 1803 (XVII) (discussing ‘per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources’, which addressed investment issues in the 
context of natural resources) <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NR0/193/11/PDF/NR019311.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 15 September 2014. For a brief 
review of earlier effforts of establishing international investment rules, see Stephan W 
Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP 2009).
The non-aligned countries, too, sought to coordinate their work vis-à-vis TNCs, espe-
cially through the establishment of a center of their own focused on these enterprises. 
See ‘Report of the Coordinating Countries in the Field of Transnational Corporations’ 
(3 to 7 September 1979) (submitted to the 1979 Havana Summit and reporting that a 
sufffĳicient number of countries had approved the statutes of the Information Center on 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by vote in the same year.10  
It was in this context that the Commission on Transnational Corporations 
(comprising representatives of governments) and UNCTC (as the secretariat 
of the Commission) were established, and the drive began to deal with TNCs 
and their FDI at the international level.11 Not surprisingly (given the context), 
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Transnational Corporations and that it should start operations immediately, located in 
Havana); Jankowitsch and Sauvant (n 7) vol V 307–308. However, the original idea for the 
establishment of the Non-Aligned Countries Information Center on Transnational 
Corporations did not materialize since only 14 countries ratifĳied the proposed Statute 
of the Center, while 20 countries should have done so. See Marjan Svetlicic and Matija 
Rojec, Transnational Corporations and Direct Foreign Investment (Research Center for 
Cooperation with Developing Countries, Ljubljana and Zimbabwe Institute of 
Development Studies, Harare 1987) 143. Instead, at the Zimbabwe Summit of the Non-
Aligned Countries (1 to 5 October 1984) it was decided in the Summit’s ‘Economic 
Declaration’ that ‘the work relating to transnational corporations and private foreign 
investment be for the present undertaken by the Research and Information System (RIS) 
of non-aligned and other developing countries until such time as a fĳinal decision is taken 
in regard to the Information Center.’ See Jankowitsch and Sauvant (n 7) vol XI 409. The RIS 
subsequently began operations, located in New Delhi.
12 The business community, too, recognized that it needed to react and, accordingly, 
adopted its own (voluntary) guidelines. See International Chamber of Commerce, 
Guidelines for International Investment (ICC 1972) (updating its ‘International Code of 
Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments’, which had been drawn up by the ICC’s 
Committees on Foreign Investments and Foreign Establishments and approved by the 
ICC’s Quebec Congress in June 1949; contained in UNCTAD, International Investment 
Instruments: A Compendium (UNCTAD 1996) vol III 273–278). Another update was under-
taken in May 2012 <http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre 
/2012/2012-ICC-Guidelines-for-International-Investment/> accessed 29 September 2014. 
The 1972 version dealt with the following subjects: investment policies, ownership and 
management, fĳinance, fĳiscal policies, legal framework, labour policies, technology, and 
commercial policies. These guidelines – which were of course available to the Code nego-
tiators – also signaled what international business was prepared to accept.
13 To quote Juergen Kuehn (who was Director in the Ministry of Economics of Germany 
and, in this capacity, the chief Code negotiator on behalf of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1983–1986). Communication by him (24 February 2014) (on fĳile with the author). 
However, this objective receeded in the background in the course of the negotiations.
14 See eg Allende (n 3) in which, among other things, he lamented that TNCs: withdraw 
wealth from the Third World; are ‘rudely transforming traditional practices in interna-
tional trade, the transfer of technology, the transmission of resources among nations, and 
labour relations’; interfere in ‘the fundamental political, economic and military deci-
sions’  of sovereign States; and ‘are not only undermining the genuine interests of the 
this drive focused on controlling TNCs, at least as far as developing countries 
were concerned, as well as a number of developed countries. However, devel-
oped countries also had a separate interest, namely to legitimize TNCs12 – in 
fact to ‘tame’13 them through legal means – in light of the world-wide criticism 
that was leveled against these fĳirms, not only in developing countries, where 
they were seen as agents of imperialism by some,14 but also in developed 
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developing countries, but their overwhelming and uncontrolled force is felt too in the 
industrialized countries in which they are based.’
15 See eg United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, The International Telephone and 
Telegraph Company and Chile 1970–1971 (Government Printing Offfĳice 1973) (the exten-
sive hearings in the United States on outward FDI and especially the activities of ITT in 
Chile). In Europe, Jean-Jacques Schreiber’s Le defĳi américain (Éditions Denoël 1968) 
received wide attention.
16 ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy, adopted by the Governing Body of the ILO on 16 November 1977.
17 UNCTAD, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control 
of Restrictive Business Practices (A/RES/35/63 5 December 1980); see UN Doc TD/RBP/
CONF/10/Rev.1 (1981).
18 See OECD, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (OECD 1976). For the 
most recent version, see <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecddeclaration 
anddecisions.htm> accessed 15 September 2014. As of late 2014, all 34 OECD member 
countries and 12 non-OECD members had adhered to the Declaration.
19 WHO, International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes (1981).
20 Guidelines for Consumer Protection (A/RES/39/248 9 April 1985).
21 Negotiations (between 1976 and 1985) of the Draft International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology were not completed <http://stdev.unctad.org/compendium/ 
documents/totcode%20.html> accessed 29 September 2014. For a discussion, see 
Surendra Patel, Pedro Rofffe and Abdulqawi Yusuf (eds), International Technology Transfer: 
The Origins and Aftermath of the United Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct 
(Kluwer International 2000).
ones.15 An international code, supported by all countries, would have blunted 
this criticism. Overall, it was recognized that, since TNCs operated in a global 
context, any efffort at regulation needed to be global as well.
This efffort, then, proceeded on two avenues: the negotiation of issue- 
specifĳic agreements and the negotiation of a comprehensive multilateral 
instrument. As to the former, a number of issue-specifĳic instruments were 
indeed successfully negotiated during the next few years, especially the 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy, agreed upon in the International Labour Organization 
(ILO);16 The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the 
Control of Restrictive Business Practices, agreed upon in the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD);17 and the Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, agreed upon in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).18  
In addition, negotiations took place on codes of conduct on breast-milk 
substitutes,19 consumer protection,20 the transfer of technology,21 and illicit 
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22 For a brief history and the text of the Draft International Agreement on Illicit Payments, see 
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_tobedeleted/iia/docs/compendium/en/9%20volume 
%201.pdf> accessed 15 September 2014. The draft was put before the General Assembly in 
1979, but the General Assembly took no action. The negotiations of this instrument, pro-
posed by the United States, were serviced by UNCTC. But since neither the developing 
countries, nor other developed countries were strongly supportive of these negotiations, 
this efffort fĳizzled out in the United Nations at that time (The CTC Reporter regularly 
covered progress in the negotiations). However, the issue was later addressed in the OECD 
and led to the adoption of the ‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Offfĳicials in International Business Transactions’, which entered into force on 
15 February 1999 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf> 
accessed 29 September 2014. The issue returned to the United Nations where eventually 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption was adopted by the General Assembly 
on 31 October 2003 (it entered into force on 14 December 2005 <http://www.unodc 
.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf> accessed 
29 September 2014.
23 The Commission also began work in the area of international accounting, partly with a 
view toward devising international reporting standards to allow a more transparent 
assessment of the activities of TNCs across jurisdictions. When the Commission eventu-
ally established the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International 
Standards of Accounting and Reporting (through ECOSOC resolution 1982/67), its man-
date did not include the authorization to set standards, but instead was reduced to pro-
moting comparability among national standards. See Lorraine Rufffĳing, ‘Transparency and 
Disclosure: Lifting the Veil from Corporate Reporting’ in Hamdani and Rufffĳing (n 1).
24 The draft Code included cross-references to the International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology (which, at that time, was negotiated in UNCTAD), the Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Priniciples and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices (also negotiated in UNCTAD), the International Agreement on Illicit 
Payments (negotiated at that time in the United Nations in New York), and the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy.
25 The Commision held a total of 20 sessions. The fĳirst session took place in New York, from 
17 to 28 March 1975, and the last session was held in Geneva from 2 to 11 May 1994. The last 
payments22.23 But the centerpiece – and umbrella – was meant to be a com-
prehensive (multilateral) United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations, defĳining the entirety of relations between governments and 
TNCs. The umbrella nature of the Code was reflected, in terms of architecture, 
in the fact that the draft included cross-references to a number of the instru-
ments just mentioned, making these separate instruments in a sense ‘chapters’ 
of the United Nations Code.24
Accordingly, the fĳirst session of the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations in 197525 established a preliminary program of work, giving the 
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session of the Commission on Transantional Corporations took place after the UNCTC had 
been abolished in 1992 and the stafff of the Centre had been transferred to Geneva and inte-
grated into UNCTAD in 1993, to continue work on MNEs and TNCs in that organization – 
see Hamdani and Rufffĳing (n 1). It recommended to ECOSOC that the Commission be 
integrated into UNCTAD’s institutioal machinery. See Commission on Transnational 
Corporations, ‘Report on the Twentieth Session (2–11 May 1994)’ (E/1994/32 ECOSOC 
Offfĳicial Records Supplement No 12).
26 See ‘Offfĳicial Records of the Economic and Social Council’ (E/5655, E/C.10/6. 59th Session, 
Supplement No 12). For the genesis of the United Nations’ work on MNEs, see Sotirios 
Mousouris in Hamdani and Rufffĳing (n 1).
27 See Offfĳicial Records (n 4) para 6.
28 See United Nations, World Investment Report 1992: Transnational Corporations as Engines 
of Growth (United Nations 1992) table I 1 and annex table 1.
Code of Conduct the highest priority.26 The Commission’s second session 
(1–12 March 1976) reafffĳirmed this program of work and stated that the objec-
tive of the United Nations Code (and UNCTC) should be, among other things, 
‘[t]o secure efffective international arrangements for the operation of transna-
tional corporations designed to promote their contribution to national devel-
opmental goals and world economic growth while controlling and eliminating 
any negative efffects.’27 The Commission’s second session also established the 
Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct to formulate the 
Code. The objective was to adopt an instrument by consensus.
2 Diffferent Underlying Interest Situations
The zeitgeist clearly reflected the desire of the great majority of countries to 
control TNCs. However, not all countries had the same priorities when the 
Commission mandated negotiations during its second session in 1976. Thus, 
it is necessary to examine the underlying interest situations of the three 
principal country groups – that of developing countries, socialist countries 
and developed countries – on the basis of which the negotiations were 
undertaken.
At the time that the Code negotiations began, virtually all developing coun-
tries were overwhelmingly recipients of FDI, i.e., host countries: their outward 
FDI amounted to about 2% of world FDI outflows between 1980–1985, averag-
ing little more than USD 1 billion during that period.28 The basic interest of 
developing countries was therefore to minimize any negative efffects of the 
engagement of TNCs in their territories, be they economic, social or politi-
cal  (see the ITT incident). At the same time, developing countries were not 
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29 For a discussion of outward FDI flows from the socialist countries, see Carl H McMillan, 
Multinationals from the Second World: Growth of Foreign Investment by Soviet and East 
European Enterprises (St Martin’s Press 1987). Yugoslavia at that time was the only 
socialist country that had, since 1967, a joint venture law, but the level of inward FDI was 
very low.
30 See Klaus A Sahlgren, ‘Scenes from my UN journey’ in Martti Ahtisaari (ed), Finns in the 
United Nations (Finnish UN Association 1996) 205. Sahlgren was UNCTC’s fĳirst Executive 
Director, serving from 1975–1982, and the highest-ranking UNCTC stafff responsible for the 
Code negotiations.
31 To quote Udo Papies (who participated, as a member of the delegation of the German 
Democratic Republic, in the Code negotiations between 1981–1989) ‘At the beginning, the 
socialist countries regarded the debate about TNCs and the negotiations of a Code as a 
conflict between developed and developing countries. In the course of the negotiations, 
however, they developed a broader interest in the Code as an instrument to reflect equal-
ity and mutual benefĳit in international economic relations.’ Communication by Udo 
Papies, 17 March 2014 (on fĳile with the author).
interested in any multilateral disciplines that could tie their hands in relation 
to the treatment of foreign investors in their (in many cases newly achieved) 
sovereign jurisdictions. Rather, they preferred national regulation of TNCs, be 
it to deal with corporate abuses, to promote their own development or to pur-
sue other public policy objectives, supported by international instruments. For 
that, they needed to maintain their national policy space in the investment 
area. Moreover, since they barely had any outward FDI flows, they had no par-
ticular interest in protecting their investors abroad. Hence, their basic interest 
was to arrive at an instrument that would prescribe multilateral rules of behav-
ior for transnational corporations (headquartered in a relatively small number 
of developed countries).
During the most active phase of the Code negotiations, virtually no socialist 
country permitted inward FDI, and their outward FDI was miniscule.29 For 
them, to quote Klaus A. Sahlgren, TNCs were ‘poisonous flowers on the dung-
heap of a dying capitalism.’30 Moreover, to the extent that they had their own 
TNCs, they insisted that these enterprises should not be covered by the Code 
as they were subject to direct government control. Eventually, as discussed 
below, this led to difffĳiculties in the context of the defĳinition of TNCs, as the 
Western countries insisted that no diffference should be made between them 
and privately owned fĳirms. For the socialist countries (in line with the position 
of the Soviet Union), the negotiations were largely a political exercise that gave 
them the opportunity to embarrass the Western countries, although eventually 
broader interests came into play.31 Beyond that, they adopted a defensive posi-
tion, namely to protect their own interest of not having their fĳirms covered by 
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32 But this is not to say that there were not intensive inter-ministerial discussions in Beijing 
on this matter.
33 See <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/CapitalMovements_WebEnglish 
.pdf> accessed 15 September 2014.
34 OECD (n 18).
35 ILO (n 16).
36 See eg Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of 
America and Japan (signed 2 April 1953) (providing that Japanese nationals residing in the 
United States may not be subjected to payment of taxes ‘more burdensome than those 
borne by’ United States nationals, and according Japan ‘most favored nation’ status.) See 
eg Japan Line Ltd v Los Angeles County, 441 US 434 (1979) (holding California state prop-
erty tax on Japanese shipping afffĳiliates unconstitutional since it results in multiple 
taxation).
the Code; and they supported the developing countries. China maintained a 
low profĳile during the Code negotiations.32
For developed countries, the situation was more complex. They were, world-
wide, the principal home and host countries. However, as far as FDI flows 
among developed countries were concerned (the bulk of their outflows and 
inflows), these were covered by instruments negotiated in the framework of 
the OECD. In particular, they could rely on the 1961 Code of Liberalisation of 
Capital Movements (even though it allowed for exceptions). Such code pro-
vided for ‘a balanced framework for countries progressively to remove barriers 
to the movement of capital, while providing flexibility to cope with situations 
of economic and fĳinancial instability.’33 This instrument was further supple-
mented in 1976 by the OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises, containing voluntary Guidelines for TNCs as well 
as decisions addressed to member governments concerning national treat-
ment, conflicting requirements and international investment incentives and 
disincentives,34 and by the global ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, containing voluntary 
guidelines in the area of social policy.35 Developed countries could also draw 
on a network of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties that protected 
not only trade but also investment; these treaties were, sometimes, as with 
respect to the United States, directly enforceable in local states courts.36
With these instruments, developed countries had a regime in place that 
reflected their principal interest: the protection of investments of their fĳirms 
abroad, which involves, in particular, the proper treatment of investors and 
investments in terms of national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, 
fair and equitable treatment (interpreted as ‘minimum standard’), prompt, 
adequate and efffective compensation upon expropriation, and the right to 
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37 Among developed countries, the right of establishment was only accepted in 1984, through 
an amendment of the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements <http://www.oecd 
.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/CapitalMovements_WebEnglish.pdf> accessed 15 September 
2014, and <http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/theexperienceoftheoecd 
withtheoecdcodeofliberalisationofcapital movements.htm> accessed 24 August 2014.
38 Interview with Rainer Geiger (who was, at the time of the Code negotiations (1977–1991), 
Head of Division, Enterprise and Consumer Afffairs, OECD and participated in the Code 
negotiations as an observer for the OECD; he also serviced the OECD Informal Contact 
Group on the Code, in the framework of which member countries coordinated their posi-
tion on the Code (1977–1981) (6 November 2013).
39 Access to markets was, at that time, not yet a major issue.
40 Kobrin (n 6).
41 In principle, there might also have been a question of the policy space of home countries. 
This became an issue about 35 years later when emerging market fĳirms – a number 
of them being state-owned enterprises – became important players in the world FDI 
repatriate profĳits. Increasingly, national treatment at the pre-establishment 
phase of an investment was added to this list.37 This regime provided devel-
oped countries with access for their fĳirms to the markets of other developed 
countries (at that time the world’s most attractive markets) and, through the 
well functioning, impartial judiciaries in developed countries, access to 
national dispute settlement if disputes should arise on account of inappropri-
ate treatment of their investors or investments. Moreover, as their regulatory 
and judicial regimes could also deal with corporate misbehavior and since they 
had, in any event, the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Tripartite Declaration, 
developed countries had no pressing interest in establishing multilateral disci-
plines for (mostly their) TNCs.
While developed countries had adequate protection in place for invest-
ments among themselves, as well mechanisms to deal with corporate abuses, 
they thought38 that protection was not guaranteed for the treatment of the 
investments of their fĳirms in developing countries.39 This was particularly 
the case in light of the uncertainties after decolonization, the number of 
nationalizations,40 the often weak and not necessarily impartial judiciaries 
in many developing countries, and the reluctance of developing countries 
to tie their hands through international investment rules. The basic interest 
of the developed countries was therefore focused on prescribing multilat-
eral  standards of behavior for how host country governments should 
treat foreign investors, in the interest of protecting their fĳirms from undue 
interference by governments in the operations of TNCs. For that, they 
needed to circumscribe the policy space of host countries,41 i.e., developing 
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market, and the question of (especially emerging market) home country government 
support for the outward FDI by their state-owned enterprises was put on the interna-
tional agenda. See Karl P Sauvant and others, ‘Trends in FDI, Home Country Measures 
and Competitive Neutrality’ in Andrea Bjorklund (ed), YB Intl Inves L & Pol’y 2013–2014 
(OUP 2014) ch 1.
42 At the time of the United Nations Code negotiations, the applicability of BITs to devel-
oped countries did not mean much, as there was little FDI from emerging markets into 
developed countries.
43 The fĳirst case arose before ICSID in 1972 (Holiday Inns SA and others v Morocco, ICSID Case 
No ARB/72/1), but the number of cases did not increase rapidly until the early 2000s; see 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&action 
Val=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English42> accessed 29 
September 2014. The establishment of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) in 1988 is also relevant. Its members agreed to allow the Agency to provide cover-
age against defĳined risks and, by issuing host country approvals and supporting a project 
through their representatives at the Board, agreed that MIGA can protect against those 
risks in their country. In doing so, they do not necessarily agree that they will be held to 
any particular standard of behavior with regard to the investment. Article 18 on subroga-
tion provides that MIGA will be subrogated to the rights of the investor without 
specifying the source or nature of those rights. Importantly, in the context of this article, 
Annex II of the convention provides for arbitration between MIGA and a member in the 
event of a dispute between them. Paragraph (g) of art 4 of the annex provides the bases 
on which the tribunal will decide the scope, and that list includes ‘applicable rules of 
international law’ as well as domestic law and other sources. Arguably this constitutes 
acceptance of international law, at least vis-à-vis MIGA.
44 Still, they provided a fall-back position for developed countries in case they could not 
reach a satisfactory agreement at the multilateral level.
45 As José E Álvarez (who participated in some of the Code negotiation sessions as part of 
the United States delegation in his capacity as an attorney adviser in the United States 
Department of State) stated: ‘the typical treaty…combined relatively weak investment 
protections with an inefffectual investor-state dispute settlement clause’; see José E 
Álvarez, ‘The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime’ in Mahnoush H Arsanjani and 
others (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael 
Reisman (Martinus Nijofff 2010) 607, 615.
countries.42 While a number of developed countries had started to negotiate 
(beginning in 1959) bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with developing coun-
tries and such treaties reafffĳirmed customary international (investment) law 
(and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
became available in 196643), the number of BITs was still relatively small (131 by 
1980),44 compared to the great number of BITs that would be ratifĳied later. The 
BITs of that day were still relatively weak,45 and the United States had barely 
begun negotiating such treaties (although, by the mid-1980s, the United States 
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46 For the evolution of the United States BITs efffort, see Kenneth J Vandevelde, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (OUP 2010); see also José E Álvarez, 
The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment (Martinus 
Nijhofff 2009) ch II.
47 Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harvard Intl L J 68.
48 There is a debate about the legal standing of resolutions by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. Stephen Schwebel, for example, seems broadly to embrace the normative 
efffect of such resolutions, although this efffect may depend on the extent to which such 
resolutions enjoy wide support; see Stephen Schwebel, ‘The Efffect of Resolutions of the 
UN General Assembly on Customary International Law’ (1979) 73 ASIL Proceedings 
301–309. Others, however, question the capacity of General Assembly resolutions to con-
tribute to customary international law; see eg Anthony D’Amato, ‘Trashing Customary 
International Law’ (1987) 81 AJIL 101–106. For a discussion, see José E Álvarez, International 
Organizations as Law-makers (OUP 2005) 159–163 and Thomas M Franck and Mark M 
Munansangu, The New International Economic Order: International Law in the Making? 
(UNITAR 1982).
49 Note that the Programme of Action on the Estalishment of a New International Economic 
Order had referred to a ‘code of conduct for transnational corporations’ (n 8) (emphasis 
BITs program was in full swing).46 Hence, the basic interest of developed coun-
tries was to arrive at a code of conduct for the governments of host countries 
(especially developing countries) in the international investment area.
Moreover, the interest situation of these three groups of countries needs to 
be seen against the background of the nascent stage of international invest-
ment law at the time the negotiations began. Jeswald W. Salacuse and Nicholas 
P. Sullivan captured that status succinctly: ‘foreign investors who sought 
the protection of international investment law encountered an ephemeral 
structure consisting largely of scattered treaty provisions, a few questionable 
customs, and contested general principles of law.’47 This situation of rudimen-
tary international investment law – consisting mostly of customary interna-
tional (investment) law – was challenged by developing countries, including in 
a number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions (e.g., on the NIEO 
and the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States).48 This made it all 
the more important for developed countries to prevent the erosion of what 
they considered established customary international law standards for the 
treatment of foreign investors and, if anything, protect and afffĳirm, if not 
strengthen, these standards.
These diffferent underlying interests of the various country groups were 
reflected in the title of the instrument to be negotiated, namely a Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations (emphasis added) – leaving it open 
what such a Code would eventually cover.49
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added). For the same reason of balance, the name of UNCTC was the ‘United Nations 
Center on Transnational Corporations’ (emphasis added) – it was neither ‘for’ nor ‘against’ 
these entities; rather, its approach was to help governements to minimize the negative 
efffects and maximize the positive efffects of the activities of TNCs. The perception of gov-
ernments and the public at large of the work of the United Nations was, however, domi-
nated by the often anti-TNC rhetoric in the Commission on Transnational Corporations, 
in which developing countries (supported by the socialist countries) often clashed with 
developed countries. The secretariat (ie, UNCTC) that prepared documents for the 
Commission and undertook a wide range of activities, on the other hand, had to serve all 
groups of countries, and its approach was therefore more balanced – even though the 
sympathy of many members of the stafff was with the developing countries.
50 For an example of someone who was skeptical that agreement could be reached, see 
Jürgen Kühn, ‘Developing Countries Rethink Their Approach to Foreign Investment’ 
(1984) 19 Intereconomics 280 (‘In view of the opposing economic interests and the difffer-
ences in historical and political developments, it may be that a worldwide project to 
establish efffective rules for investment protection will forever be a[n] utopia’) (Kühn was 
one of the Code negotiators).
51 The challenge is, of course, to distinguish between legitimate public policy objectives, as 
opposed to other objectives (eg protectionist ones).
In principle, it should have been possible to bridge the diffferent starting 
positions of developed and developing countries.50 There was a certain degree 
of overlapping interest, even if for diffferent reasons, to take action: developed 
countries wanted to legitimize the outward investment of their fĳirms (vis-à-vis 
their trade unions and developing countries) and strengthen the protection of 
their TNCs, while developing countries wanted to have an instrument that 
would help them to deal with any negative efffects of TNC investments. In a 
number of countries, there was pressure from trade unions and media. And, 
together, this created the political will to move forward.
The key challenge was, therefore, to reconcile the diffferent basic interest 
situations of home and host countries and the objectives that flowed from 
them in relation to the role of international investment law and the responsi-
bilities of governments and fĳirms. As home countries, governments want to 
maximize protection for their fĳirms investing abroad, and facilitate their oper-
ations, i.e., they seek the constraints that international investment law imposes 
on the treatment of foreign investors and their investments, and they have res-
ervations regarding the constraints that guidelines impose on certain activities 
of TNCs. As host countries, governments seek to preserve a maximum amount 
of national policy space to be able to pursue public policy objectives,51 i.e., they 
seek to preserve the flexibility that the national regulatory regime provides for 
the treatment of foreign investors and their investments (including to regulate 
corporate behavior they consider undesirable and to attract investment they 
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52 For a discussion of the OECD Declaration and, in particular, the OECD Guidelines, see 
among others (apart from the literature referenced elsewhere in this article) Roger 
Blanpain, The OECD Guidelines or Multinational Enterprises and Labour Relations, 1976–1979: 
Experience and Review (Kluwer 1979); Claes Hägg, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: A Critical Analysis’ (1984) 3:1 Journal of Business Ethics 71–76; Jacques Rojot, 
‘The 1984 Revision of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (1985) 23:3 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 279–397; Stephen Tully, ‘The 2000 Review of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2001) 50:2 Intl & Comp L Q 394–404; 
Gefĳion Schuler, ‘Efffective Governance Through Decntralized Soft Implementation: The 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2008) 9:11 German L J 1753–1778; Sarah 
Fick Vendzules, ‘The Struggle for Legitimacy in Environmental Standards Systems: The 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2010) 21:3 Colorado J Intl Env L & Pol’y 
451–489; Joshua S Yang and others, ‘A Question of Balance: Addressing the Public Health 
Impacts of Mutlinational Enteprises in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises’ (2012) 7:10 Global Public Health 1045–1061.
53 For a discussion of the ILO Declaration, see among others (apart from the literature refer-
enced elsewhere in this article), Roger Blanpain (ed), Multinational Enterprises and the 
Social Challenges of the XXIst Century (Kluwer Law International 2000); Janelle M Diller, 
‘Social Conduct in Transnational Enterprise Operations: The Role of the International 
Labour Organization’ ibid, 17–28; Jernej Letnar Cernic, ‘Corporate Responsibility for 
Human Rights: Analyzing the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy’ (2009) 6:1 Miskolc J Intl L 24–34.
considered desirable), and they support, especially if they are relatively weak, 
the constraints that guidelines impose on certain activities of TNCs.
The challenge was – and remains – to bridge these diffferent basic interest 
situations and fĳind the right balance between how these various objectives can 
be accommodated, as reflected in the relative respect accorded to national 
laws and regulations on the one hand and international investment law on the 
other, in relation to both, the treatment of foreign investors and their invest-
ments and the responsibilities of investors and governments. Any comprehen-
sive multilateral instrument on international investment needs to take these 
underlying tensions into account.
3 The Experience with the OECD and ILO Declarations and  
the UNCTAD Set
Before turning to the United Nations Code negotiations themselves, it is neces-
sary to look at the experience of the negotiations of the OECD52 and ILO53 
Declarations and the negotiations of the UNCTAD Restrictive Business 
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54 For a discussion of the UNCTAD Set see Stuart E Benson, ‘The UN Code on Restrictive 
Business Practices: An International Antitrust Code is Born’ (1981) 30 The American 
University L Rev; Colin R Greenhill, ‘UNCTAD: Control of Restrictive Business Practices’ 
(1978) 12:1 JWT 67–74; Thomas B Atkeson and David G Gill, ‘The UNCTAD Restrictive 
Business Practices Code: A Step in the North-South Dialogue’ (1981) 15:1 Intl L 1–23; Stuart 
E Benson, ‘UN Conference on Restrictive Business Practices’ (1980) 74:2 AJIL 451–453; 
Furnish, ‘A Transnational Approach to Restrictive Business Practices’ (1970) 4 Intl L 322–
27; David G Gill, ‘The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code: A Code for 
Competition’ (1979) 13 Intl L 607; Sagafĳi-Nejad and Dunning (n 1) 127–36; Lee E Preston 
and Duane Windsor, The Rules of the Game in the Global Economy: Policy Regimes for 
International Business (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997) 79–81.
55 The OECD Guidelines, as adopted in 1976, contained the following chapters: General poli-
cies; Disclosure of information; Competition; Financing; Taxation; Employment and 
industrial relations; and Science and Technology. Later, the following chapters were 
added: Concepts and Principles; Human Rights; Environment; Combatting Bribery, Bribe 
Solicitation and Extortion; and Consumer Interests. In addition, text in individual chap-
ters was changed from time to time to update it in light of factual developments and new 
insights as to the desirability of international directives, and often congruent with 
national laws. Moreover, the fĳinancing chapter was dropped, apparently because the 
guideline could not be formulated concretely enough to be of practical use as a guideline 
without intervening too much into the operational activities of fĳirms. I am grateful to 
Marino Baldi (who was Ambassador of Switzerland, Deputy Director, Federal Offfĳice of 
External Economic Afffairs, and Chair of the Western European and Others Group in 
the Code negotiations (1983–1993); he was also a participant in the negotiations of the 
Restrictive Business Practices Set) for these explanations. Communication by Marino 
Baldi, 20 March 2014 (on fĳile with the author).
56 The three decisions adopted in 1976 were ‘Decision of the Council on Inter-Governmental 
Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’; ‘Decision 
of the Council on National Treatment’; and ‘Decision of the Council on Interna-
tional  Investment Incentives and Disincentives’. See <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
mne/50024800.pdf> accessed 15 September 2014. In 1984, a Decision on conflicting 
requirements was added to the Declaration; see <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
mne/50024913.pdf> accessed 15 September 2014.
Practices Set.54 This is because these instruments were negotiated in the 
shadow of the Code discussions, they were intimately linked to them and they 
foreshadowed a number of the difffĳiculties that the Code negotiations were to 
experience.
For one, the OECD Declaration was only possible because it involved a quid-
pro-quo: Guidelines for MNEs55 versus one decision dealing with follow-up 
procedures and two dealing with the treatment of investors and investments 
by governments, among which the national treatment instrument was particu-
larly important.56 The voluntary nature of the Guidelines reflects an OECD 
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57 Although individual subjects may well be regulated in a binding manner at the national 
level of adhering countries and may also be addressed in other international instruments. 
The OECD describes the Guidelines as ‘the only multilaterally agreed comprehensive 
code of responsible business conduct that governments have committed to promoting.’ 
See OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2011) 3.
58 Another example for this approach is the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Offfĳicials in International Business Transactions (n 22). However, Article 1 
of the Convention obliges signatories to make bribery of foreign offfĳicials a criminal 
offfence. It should also be noted that, in the OECD context, the distinction between ‘vol-
untary’ and ‘binding’ is not always clear-cut as observance in both cases is mainly achieved 
through peer review/pressure. I am grateful to Manfred Schekulin, Chair of the OECD’s 
Investment Committee, for pointing this out to me. Communication by Manfred 
Schekulin, 7 March 2014 (on fĳile with the author).
59 The ILO Declaration, as adopted in 1977, contained the following headings: GENERAL 
POLICIES; EMPLOYMENT, Employment promotion, Equality of opportunity and treat-
ment, Security of employment; TRAINING, CONDITIONS OF WORK AND LIFE, Wages, 
benefĳits and conditions of work, Safety and health; INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Freedom 
of association and the right to organise, Collective bargaining, Consultation, Examination 
of grievances, and Settlement of industrial disputes. A list of international labor conven-
tions and recommendations referred to in the Declaration was contained in an adden-
dum, which was amended in 1987, 1995, 2000, and 2006. Furthermore, in 1986, the 
Governing Body of the International Labour Offfĳice adopted a ‘Procedure for the examina-
tion of disputes concerning the application of the Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy by means of interpretation of its 
provisions.’ See <http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index 
.htm> accessed 15 September 2014.
60 They are also sought to reflect good practices for national fĳirms. See Hans Guenter, ‘The 
Tripartite Declaration of Priniciples (ILO): Standards and Follow-up’ in Norbert Horn (ed), 
Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises (Kluwer 1980) 156–157. 
See also Nordic Tripartite Seminar on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
Summary of Proceedings (Helsinki, Finland 26 and 27 September 1989).
approach according to which international standards for government behavior 
may, but need not, be legally binding, while international recommendations 
for the behavior of non-governmental actors should not. Accordingly, the sub-
stantive parts of the Guidelines, addressed to MNEs operating in or from 
adhering countries, are voluntary,57 but the commitment of adhering coun-
tries to implement and promote them (e.g., by setting up National Contact 
Points), which took the form of a separate Council Decision, is not.58
The ILO Tripartite Declaration,59 for its part, was also voluntary, was 
addressed jointly to governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations and 
TNCs and applied regardless of the nature of ownership (i.e., public, private or 
mixed),60 reflecting the tripartite character of the ILO in their home and host 
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61 Interviews with Philippe Brusick (who took part in the preparatory process and then the 
two negotiating conferences on UNCTAD’s Restrictive Business Practices Set, before he 
became Head of UNCTAD’s Competition and Consumer Protection Branch, from 1985 to 
2006) and Hassan Qaqaya (26 January 2014).
62 See ‘ILO: Draft on Transnationals Ready for Approval’ and ‘OECD: Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ (1977) 2 The CTC Reporter 28, 30.
63 In 1978, the United Nations General Assembly convened the United Nations Conference 
on Restrictive Business Practices, which held two negotiating sessions in November-
December 1979 and April 1980. The negotiations were completed in 1980, during the 
Administration of President Jimmy Carter, and the Code was adopted by the General 
Assembly at the end of 1980.
countries. This Declaration focuses only on one specifĳic part of the activities of 
TNCs, namely social policy. It was clear that the Tripartite Declaration’s imple-
mentation depended on the active cooperation of the business community, 
given the tripartite structure of the ILO. The Tripartite Declaration was there-
fore a more limited instrument.
Finally, in the case of the UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Set, a vol-
untary instrument as well, there was also a trade offf: developing countries 
sought to control especially restrictive business practices related to trade by 
TNCs and abuses of dominant positions by these fĳirms, as these were seen as 
hindering their development. The developed countries saw the Set as a step 
toward dismantling state and para-statal monopolies (along with their vertical 
restrictive business practices) in developing countries (and later also in transi-
tion economies), improving in this manner access to the markets of the coun-
tries involved and obtaining wider acceptance of their conception of 
competition policy.61
Second, the two Declarations were negotiated and adopted in very little 
time, less than one-and-a-half years,62 and the UNCTAD Set was negotiated in 
a little bit more than a year.63 This shows what is possible if self-interest, pres-
sure and political will are present. Particularly relevant here is that trade 
unions in developed countries had employment and industrial relations con-
cerns, including about the offf-shoring of jobs and the impact of the rise of 
international production networks on their collective bargaining positions; 
accordingly, they put pressure on friendly (especially social-democratic) gov-
ernments to take action. The adoption of the two Declarations, therefore, 
reduced the pressure on developed countries’ governments from one of their 
important constituencies, and the adoption of the Restrictive Business 
Practices Set took care of one of the concerns of the developing countries. 
The adoption of the Declarations and the Set also represented a ‘pre-emptive 
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64 As Kari Tapiola, ‘The Heritage of the UN Code of Conduct’ in Hamdani and Rufffĳing (n 1) 
described the OECD Guidelines.
65 Tapiola ibid, described the ILO Tripartite Declaration as a ‘universal and more detailed 
rendering of the principles that had some months earlier been established within the 
OECD’ to be ‘used where it was more specifĳic – and, of course, it was valid outside the 
industrialized country area.’
66 The OECD had established an Informal Contact Group on the Code, to allow member 
countries to coordinate their position on the United Nations Code. At the time of the 
Code negotiations, when Sten Niklasson (the Chair of the Intergovernmental Working 
Group on a Code of Conduct during the duration that that Group met) was Vice-Chair of 
the OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, he 
deliberately abstained from intervening in the internal OECD coordination on the Code. 
The OECD Informal Contact Group on the Code was serviced by Rainer Geiger of the 
OECD secretariat. Communication by Rainer Geiger (8 January 2014) (on fĳile with 
the author).
67 Communication by Marino Baldi (9 January 2014) (on fĳile with the author).
strike’64 against the United Nations Code, as it signaled that the developed 
countries, in which the overwhelming number of TNCs were based, had 
recognized that something needed to be done to legitimize the role of these 
fĳirms in international economic relations and national economies, neutraliz-
ing in this manner at least some of the pressure of trade unions at the multilat-
eral level.
Third, and accordingly, the OECD Guidelines, the ILO Tripartite Declaration 
and the UNCTAD Set showed the limit of what developed countries were will-
ing to accept as guiding their fĳirms.65 In that sense, the two instruments repre-
sented the coordinated bargaining platform of the developed countries for the 
guidelines aspect of the United Nations Code negotiations.66 Agreement on 
these three instruments was also facilitated by the fact that they were largely in 
line with the domestic regulatory framework of most OECD members. If any-
thing, developed countries were prepared to go further amongst themselves 
(as far as the OECD Guidelines were concerned), and be more precise in this 
respect than they would have wanted to be within a global context, as the 
OECD countries were largely like-minded, facilitating the defĳinition of a com-
mon self interest and reducing the fear that provisions would be interpreted in 
an unacceptable manner.67
Fourth, this like-mindedness is also reflected in the OECD Guidelines’ rela-
tively strong implementation mechanism, which was strengthened over time. 
The OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises (CIME), which later merged with the Capital Movement Committee 
in charge of the Liberalisation Code to form the Investment Committee, has 
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68 That Working Party was eventually discontinued, replaced in 2013 by the Working Party 
on Responsible Business Conduct.
69 The follow-up procedures for the Guidelines were incorporated into a binding Council 
decision (n 56). It applies however only to the procedure, not the outcome (eg clarifĳica-
tions and recommendations, which are not binding). The clarifĳication process was devel-
oped starting in 1977, ie, almost immediately after the adoption of the Guidelines as a 
result of cases submitted, and this practice was formalized by the 1979 Review and incor-
porated in a revised Council decision C (79) 143.
70 See <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps> accessed 15 September 2014.
71 See OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, revised 27 June 2000 <http://www 
.oecd.org/investment/mne/1922428.pdf> accessed 29 September 2014.
72 OECD 2011 (n 57).
the mandate, through its Working Party on the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises,68 to monitor the implementation of the Guidelines 
and to clarify the Guidelines in the light of concrete cases/issues brought to its 
attention. Although the Committee cannot pronounce itself on the behavior 
of individual enterprises, it can take cases as illustrations of issues that need a 
clarifĳication of the meaning of the Guidelines, thereby giving strength to the 
implementation of the instrument.69
In 1979, furthermore, it was decided to establish National Contact Points in 
adherent countries to ‘[contribute] to the resolution of issues that arise from 
the alleged non-observance of the guidelines in specifĳic instances.’70 This 
introduced another layer of institutions to deal with grievances related to 
TNCs. The Guidelines’ implementation mechanism was strengthened further 
as a result of the 2000 review by adding procedural guidelines for the handling 
of specifĳic instances by the National Contact Points and improving the linkage 
between the National Contact Points and the Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises. In particular, the review provided 
that issues could be raised before the National Contact Points by any inter-
ested party, including non-governmental organizations and even individu-
als.71 The 2011 review of the Guidelines established indicative timelines for the 
National Contact Points for issues brought to their attention. It provided that 
they needed to act in a manner that is impartial, predictable and equitable, 
and that statements needed to be issued on cases when these are closed. Most 
importantly, consultative status with the Investment Committee was extended 
to OECD Watch, the OECD Investment Committee’s recognized representa-
tive of civil society organizations.72 The latest improvement came in 2013 
when a Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct was established to, 
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73 OECD, Reviewing the Mandates of the Subsidiary Bodies of the Investment Committee 
(DAF/INV(2013)15/REV1 15 November 2013). The Chair of the Working group is Roel 
Nieuwenkamp (Netherlands).
74 Initially through a Committee of ILO’s Governing Body and, then, in the context of an ILO 
organizational reform (in 1993), the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Legal Afffairs 
and International Labour Standards. In 2010, most committees were abolished; subjects 
have since been discussed and acted upon on the basis of a plenary agenda item of the 
ILO’s Governing Body.
75 As Tapiola pointed out, the negotiations of the ILO Tripartite Declaration had taken place 
largely on the basis of the OECD Guidelines text. This meant ‘that the ILO instrument can 
continue to be used in the OECD context in the cases where it is more specifĳic.’ Moreover, 
‘[t]he follow-up procedures of both instruments have over the years not produced contra-
dictory conclusions, and thus the danger of “forum shopping” (or trying to get a more 
favourable opinion) has been avoided.’ Kari Tapiola, ‘The OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Other Global Instruments for Corporate Responsibility’ 
(Presentation to the Roundtable on Global Instruments OECD, Paris, 19 June 2001) 5, 6. 
See also Tapiola (n 64).
This was confĳirmed in the 1979 OECD review report, which stated: ‘Wherever [the 
ILO] principles refer to the behavior expected from enterprises, they parallel the OECD 
Guidelines and do not conflict with them. They can, therefore, be of use in relation to the 
OECD Guidelines to the extent they are of a greater degree of elaboration.’ However, the 
review report continued to emphasize: ‘It must, however, be born in mind that the respon-
sibilities for the follow-up procedures of the OECD Guidelines and of the ILO Declaration 
are institutionally separate.’ See OECD, International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises: Review of the 1976 Declaration and Decisions (OECD 1979) para 30.
76 Interview with Kari Tapiola (12 March 2014).
77 See Part IV of the Procedures adopted by the Governing Body at its 214th Session 
(November 1980); see Offfĳicial Bulletin, vol LXIV (1981), Series A, No 1, pp. 990.
78 See the 1986 ILO, ‘Procedure for the Examination of Disputes Concerning the Application 
of the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy by Means of Interpretation of its Provisions’ 17 <http://www.ilo.org/empent/
Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 29 September 2014. For a dis-
cussion of the procedure, in the framework of a review of the Tripartite Declaration’s 
among other things, ‘assist in enhancing the efffectiveness of the Guidelines’ in 
the context of a pro-active agenda.73
The ILO Tripartite Declaration’s implementation mechanism, for its part, 
provided a forum for discussion of matters related to follow-up74 and inter-
pretation.75 The Declaration’s original text did not foresee a procedure for 
interpretation in the event of a disagreement among the parties as to the mean-
ing of the text, but it was agreed among the parties that one would be adopted 
later on.76 In 1981, then, a procedure was instituted in this respect,77 which was 
elaborated in an updated procedure in 1986 that is still applicable today.78 The 
0002252332.INDD   33 1/13/2015   1:55:55 PM
34 Sauvant
the journal of world investment & trade 16 (2015) 11-87
301394
working during its fĳirst ten years, see Jacques Lemoine, ‘The ILO Tripartite Declaration: 
Ten Years After’ (1988) 25 The CTC Reporter 22–28.
79 However, if agreement could not be reached, a request could be referred to the full com-
mittee for unanimous decision (n 78). The unanimity requirement was maintained fol-
lowing the shift to the Committee from the Subcommittee of ILO’s Governing Body. The 
revised procedure adopted in 1986 provided that ‘The Offfĳicers of the Committee on 
Multinational Enterprises shall decide unanimously after consultations …’ (para 4 in the 
pertinent part of 1986 version adopted to replace the 1980 procedures (n 78)). The 2010 
reform and revision of the Governing Body’s rules changed the Committee on 
Multinational Enterprises into a Section of the Policy Segment of the Governing Body, 
and these take place in plenary.
80 The surveys of the efffect given to the ILO Declaration, completed at the request of the 
Governing Body, were based on the Governing Body’s requests for voluntary replies by 
member states to a questionnaire. Governments, employers and workers could separately 
or jointly submit their responses. Eight surveys were conducted since the Declaration was 
adopted, and the analytic as well as country-specifĳic profĳiles were reported to the 
Governing Body; the results, in turn, informed the ILO priorities in work with member 
states. For the results of the seventh survey (covering 100 member countries) see <http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb280/mne-1-1.htm> and <http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb280/pdf/mne-1-2.pdf> accessed 
15 September 2014. The last (2005) survey was the eighth; see <http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb294/pdf/mne-1-2.pdf> accessed 15 September 2014. 
The ILO’s current approach comprises the establishment of an information-gathering 
system that replaces the periodic surveys <http://www.ilo.org/gb/GBSessions/GB320/
pol/WCMS_236168/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 15 September 2014.
Procedure is however quite restrictive, requiring among other things that the 
relevant (tripartite) committee needed to decide unanimously (after consulta-
tions) whether a request was receivable.79 Follow-up also included the conduct 
of surveys (eventually discontinued),80 the addition of cross-references to new 
ILO Declarations (e.g., on core labor standards) and the active promotion of the 
instrument. Eventually (in 2010), the ILO Helpdesk for Business and International 
Labour Standards was established through which fĳirms (and others) can obtain 
information pertaining to international labor standards in general, including 
those contained in the Tripartite Declaration.
The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Set also foresaw an implemen-
tation mechanism, the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive 
Business Practices (in 2000 renamed the Intergovernmental Group of Experts 
on Competition Law and Policy), meeting annually, and the quinquennial 
review conference; these provided a platform for discussions and consulta-
tions. However, these intergovernmental mechanisms were not used to amend 
or elaborate the Set. The intergovernmental machinery also did not issue 
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81 See UNCTAD Set (n 17) Section G (ii) 4.
82 For a review of the activities related to the Set, see eg ‘Report of the Thirteenth Session of 
the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Policy’ (TD/B/C.I/CLP/25, 8–10 
July 2013). In 2001, the WTO noted that about 80 countries, including some 50 developing 
countries and transition economies, had adopted competition laws; in 2007, the World 
Bank counted 106 competetion authorities, including in six regional integration group 
bodies. See R S Khemani, Competition Policy and Promotion of Investment, Economic Growth 
and Poverty Alleviation in Least Developed Countries (2007) FIAS Occasional Paper 19. 
The work of the Secretariat was helped by the increased attention that governments gave 
to competition issues, including in the context of the European Union’s Single Market, the 
demise of the centrally planned economies and widespread privatizations.
83 Apparently, only once, in January 2012, did a fĳirm raise an issue in relation to another fĳirm, 
involving the activities of an Australian TNC operating in Chile in the mining and quarry-
ing sector. The Chilean fĳirm alleged that the Australian TNC had breached Guidelines 
provisions relating to human rights; employment and industrial relations; and consumer 
interests. The Chilean National Contact Point is undertaking an initial assessment of this 
complaint. See <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/searchresults/?hf=10&b=0&sl 
=mne&q=!H!all&s=desc(mne_datereceived)> accessed 15 September 2014. On the other 
hand, no case has been raised by one NGO against another, although this could theoreti-
cally be done if the NGO in question can be considered as an enterprise.
clarifĳications or interpret the Set. In fact, the instrument explicitly provided 
that ‘[i]n the performance of its functions, neither the Intergovernmental 
Group nor its subsidiary organs shall act like a tribunal or otherwise pass judge-
ment on the activities or conduct of individual Governments or of individual 
enterprises in connexion with a specifĳic business transaction.’81 It probably 
would have been too difffĳicult to utilize these various mechanisms in a multilat-
eral context to strengthen the Set. It was only through the active work of the 
UNCTAD Secretariat (which included the preparation of a model competition 
law, peer reviews of the experience of individual countries and capacity build-
ing in developing countries) that the Set became widely known and led to the 
establishment of competition authorities in emerging markets.82
Fifth, the implementation mechanism, importantly, not only allows govern-
ments to raise issues in the competent committee, but also trade unions and 
business. While this possibility is inherent in the tripartite structure of the ILO, 
it was (and is) particularly important in the OECD. There, the Trade Union 
Advisory Committee (TUAC) and, in principle, the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee (BIAC),83 can bring cases to the attention of the OECD’s 
committee structure, for the purpose of clarifying the Guidelines. As already 
mentioned, the 2011 review of the Guidelines gave this right also to non- 
governmental organizations, which had already received the right, through the 
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84 Non-governmental organizations, as grouped in the OECD Watch, are also invited, along-
side BIAC and TUAC, to stakeholder consultations; they participated actively in the 2000 
and 2011 reviews.
85 See OECD, ‘Previous Requests for Clarifĳication of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises’, DAFFE/IME/WPG/RD(2001) 4 (16 March 2001). The fĳirst case involved a 
United States company, Raytheon, that had closed a subsidiary in Belgium without 
respecting Begian law on employee notice and compensation. See Roger Blanpain, The 
Badger Case and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Kluwer Law 
International 1977). Of the 30 cases until the end of 1999, the top three provisions for 
which clarifĳication were sought were paras 6, 9 and 3 under ‘Employment and Industrial 
Relations.’
86 In 1977, the fĳirst opportunity to submit cases, TUAC submitted 11 cases and governments 
2 cases.
87 It is difffĳicult to determine the exact number of cases submitted to National Contact Points, 
as not all of them report cases to the OECD Secretariat. For the number of cases recorded 
by the OECD (n 83). OECD Watch has its own reporting <http://oecdwatch.org/cases/ 
statistics> accessed 29 September 2014. For TUAC <http://www.tuacoecdmneguidelines.org/ 
statistics.asp> accessed 15 September 2014; <http://www.tuacoecdmneguidelines 
.org/Docs/TradeUnionGuide.pdf> accessed 15 September 2014. The three subjects on the 
basis of which cases were brought since 2000 were, in the case of trade unions: paras 1(b) 
(Right to collective bargaining); 1(a) (Right to organise); and 6 (Provide information on 
changes in operations with major employment efffects) under Employment and Industrial 
Relations. In the case of non-governmental organizations, the distribution was: General 
Policies; Employment and Industrial Relations; and Environment. One case was brought 
by an individual. If those who raised cases are not satisfĳied with the response they received 
from a National Contact Point, they can request that the OECD Investment Committee 
take up the matter.
2000 review, to raise cases with the National Contact Points.84 This provision – 
combined with the existence of the implementation machinery for the 
Guidelines – proved to be crucial: until the end of 1999, the majority of the 30 
cases/issues brought for clarifĳication were raised by trade unions (trade unions 
brought 19 cases and governments brought 11 cases),85 beginning immediately 
after the adoption of the Guidelines.86 Between the beginning of 2000 and the 
end of 2013, around 300 cases had been submitted to the National Contact 
Points, virtually all by non-governmental organizations and trade unions.87
The trade unions and, subsequently, non-governmental organizations, 
made the voluntary Guidelines a ‘living’ instrument, together with an actively 
managed committee structure.
In the case of the ILO Tripartite Declaration, more than 50 requests 
for interpretation of the instrument’s provisions had been submitted until 
1994, but ‘only a handful of them could be taken up, since the others related to 
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88 Presentation by a representative of the ILO Secretariat at the 20th session of the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations; see Commission on Transnational 
Corporations (n 25). In particular, freedom-of-association cases, the most frequent type 
of cases that arose under the Tripartite Declaration, were taken up in the Committee on 
Freedom of Association, a committee that trade unions did not want to weaken; inter-
view with Kari Tapiola (24 January 2014). According to Tapiola, interpretation requests 
have by and large been dormant since the fĳirst half of the 1990s. Communication by Kari 
Tapiola (3 May 2014) (on fĳile with the author).
89 Reviews took place in 1979, 1984, 1991, 2000, and 2011.
90 Communication by Philippe Brusick (5 July 2014) (on fĳile with the author).
matters that, in principle, could be dealt with more appropriately under the 
follow-up mechanisms of certain ILO conventions.’88 Again, trade unions were 
the driving force.
Finally, in the case of the UNCTAD Set, only governments are allowed to 
raise issues in the competent intergovernmental body – probably the principal 
reason why the application of the Set took place primarily through the 
Secretariat’s work.
None of these instruments, however, foresees penalties for non-observance – 
a limitation of any voluntary instrument.
Sixth, as evidenced by subsequent developments, after the OECD Guidelines 
had been adopted and there were interested stakeholders who made use of 
them, it was possible to build on the text and strengthen it, in an incremental 
process through a number of reviews.89 In fact, in subsequent reviews, chap-
ters were added to the Guidelines, their scope was greatly expanded to cover 
supply chains and the implementation mechanism was strengthened, includ-
ing by further opening it up to civil society. Although agreement on a follow-up 
mechanism was reached only later in the case of the ILO Tripartite Declaration, 
it was strengthened by further references to newer conventions and recom-
mendations. In the case of the UNCTAD Set, on the other hand, no further 
strengthening of the instrument took place at the intergovernmental level for 
fear of unwinding what has already been achieved.90 As previously mentioned, 
all further work on the Set took place through the work of the Secretariat, with 
the main success having been the adoption of national competition laws.
Since the OECD Declaration was adopted before the negotiations on the 
United Nations Code had begun, the ILO Declaration during the fĳirst year of 
the Code negotiations and the UNCTAD Set during the most active phase of 
the Code negotiations, these instruments set the stage and provided back-
ground for the Code negotiations. Also, importantly, at least two of these three 
instruments assuaged the concerns of a key constituency supporting global 
guidelines: trade unions.
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91 The Working Group met as follows: 1st session, 10–15 January 1977; 2nd session, 18 April–4 
May 1977; 3rd session, 6–14 February 1978; 4th session, 20–31 March 1978; 5th session, 
18–29 September 1978; 6th session, 8–19 January 1979; 7th session, 12–23 March 1979; 
8th session, 7–18 January 1980; 9th session, 17–23 March 1979; 10th session, 12–21 May 
1980; 11th session, 13–24 October 1980; 12th session, 5–23 January 1981; 13th session, 6–17 
April 1981; 14th session, 18–29 May 1981; 15th session, 4–15 January 1982; 16th session, 
1–12 March 1982; 17th session, 10–21 May 1982; see <http://lib-unique.un.org/DPI/DHL/
unique.nsf?Open> accessed 15 September 2014. At its 17th session, the Working Group 
submitted its fĳinal report (E/C.10/1982/6) to the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations, meeting for the eighth time, 30 August–10 September 1982; that report 
contained the draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, as negotiated by 
the Working Group (ie, with brackets indicating unresolved issues and alternative 
texts).
92 UNCTC prepared numerous documents in support of the Code negotiations. See eg 
UNCTC, Transnational Corporations: Issues Involved in the Formulation of a Code of 
Conduct (United Nations 1976); United Nations, Transnational Corporations: Materials 
Relevant to the Formulation of a Code of Conduct (United Nations 1977); Patrick 
Robinson, The Question of a Reference to International Obligations in the United Nations 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC 1986), UNCTC Current Studies, 
Series A, No 1; Detlev Vagts, The Question of a Reference to International Obligations in 
the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: A Diffferent View 
(UNCTC 1986), UNCTC Current Studies, Series A, No 2; UNCTC, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (United Nations 1988); UNCTC, Key Concepts in International Investment 
Arrangements and Their Relevance to Negotiations on International Transactions in 
Services (UNCTC 1990), UNCTC Current Studies, Series A, No 13; and UNCTC, The New 
Code Environment (UNCTC 1990), UNCTC Current Studies, Series A, No 16. In addition to 
these published studies, available from the Sales Section of the United Nations, UNCTC 
also prepared many offfĳicial documents dealing with Code issues for the consideration of 
the Working Group, the Commission and the special sessions of the Commission. Many 
of them are listed in The CTC Reporter, which also reported regularly about the progress 
of the negotiations. Issue no 12 (summer 1982) reproduces the text of the Working Group 
on the Code, as submitted to the Commission on Transantional Corporations 3–4, 23–26, 
as well as a number of short articles dealing with various aspects of the negotiations, from 
diffferent perspectives. Issue no 29 (spring 1990) also contains a number of essays of par-
ticular relevance to the Code negotiations.
4 The Code Negotiations
The negotiations in the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of 
Conduct began 10–15 January 1977, during the fĳirst of its 17 sessions;91 they 
were serviced by UNCTC as the secretariat.92 All sessions were chaired by 
Sten Niklasson (Sweden), who managed to create, according to Sahlgren, 
‘a very good ambience, almost one of camaraderie, while maintaining a high 
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93 Communication by Klaus A Sahlgren (13 January 2014) (on fĳile with the author). The Chair 
of the Working Group also made special effforts to forge agreement. As Sten Niklasson 
recollects: ‘a number of hurdles were overcome by invitations to a few key delegates to a 
remote castle in Sweden, where everyone was locked up until compromise solutions were 
struck.’ Communication by Sten Niklasson (9 February 2014) (on fĳile with the author).
Guttorm Vik (who represented Norway in the Code negotiations from the early 1980s 
to the early 1990s; he was at that time Senior Counselor and subsequently Head of 
Division, Counselor of Embassy (in the United Nations Mission of Norway in New York) 
and Deputy Director General in the Norwegian Foreign Service; he also represented the 
Nordic countries in the Commission for two terms) characterized the atmosphere of the 
Code discussions in the Commission and ECOSOC as follows: ‘some “Young Turks” from 
the G77… seemed more interested in riding their ideological hobbyhorses than in reach-
ing reasonable compromises and promoting mutual interests.’ See Guttorm Vik, ‘A UN 
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: A Good Idea Whose Time had not 
Come’ in Hamdani and Rufffĳing (n 1). In contrast to the often politicized atmosphere 
in the Commission, the tenor of negotiations in the Working Group was usually more 
pragmatic.
94 The Working Group reported on progress to the regular sessions of the Commission; for 
that purpose, the Commission had a permanent agenda item, although its wording 
changed over time, and eventually did no longer refer to the Code. More specifĳically, 
beginning with its third session in 1977 and until 1981, the Commission’s agenda included 
an item entitled ‘Work Related To The Formulation Of A Code Of Conduct: Report Of The 
Intergovernmental Working Group On A Code Of Conduct’ in which the progress on the 
negotiations was discussed. After the work of the Working Group had ended, and at 
the Commission’s eighth’s session in 1982, the agenda item became ‘Work Related To The 
Formulation Of A Code Of Conduct’ and ‘Work Related To The Formulation Of A Code Of 
Conduct On Transnational Corporations’ in 1983. In 1984, the agenda item became ‘Work 
Related To The Formulation Of A Code Of Conduct On Transnational Corporations And 
Other International Arrangements And Agreements’. In 1992, the agenda item was listed 
as, ‘International Arrangements And Agreements Relating To Transnational Corporations.’ 
In 1993, it was ‘International, Regional And Bilateral Arrangements And Agreements 
Relating To Transnational Corporations’. In 1994, it became ‘International Arrangements 
And Agreements Relating To Foreign Direct Investment And Transnational Corporations, 
Incuding Guidelines And Other Instruments’.
95 Apart from the Code literature referenced elsewhere here, the literature includes Samuel 
K B Asante, ‘Doctrinal Diffferences on the Code of Conduct’ in Hamdani and Rufffĳing (n 1); 
for a more detailed discussion, see Asante’s ‘The Concept of the Good Corporate 
Citizen in International Business’ (1989) 1 ICSID Rev Foreign Investment L J 1–38, and his 
intellectual standard’,93 although, not surprisingly, the atmosphere became 
more precarious and testy later during the negotiations.94
There is no need to rehearse in detail what had and had not been agreed 
upon during the negotiations, as others have written about it.95 Sufffĳice it to say 
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‘The January 1986 Reconvened Special Session’ (1986) 21 The CTC Reporter 14–19; Stephan 
Coonrod, ‘The United Nations Code of Conduct for [sic] Transnational Corporations’ 
(1977) 18 Harvard Intl L J 273–307; International Bar Association, Codes of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations: Signals of Public Expectations (International Bar Association, 
Section on Business Law 1981); A A Fatouros, ‘The UN Code of Conduct of [sic] 
Transnational Corporations: Problems of interpretation and Implementation’ in Seymour 
J Rubin and Gary Clyde Hufbauer (eds), Emerging Standards of International Trade and 
Investment (Rowman & Allanheld 1983) 101–118; Horn (n 60); Carsten-Thomas Ebenroth 
and Joachim Karl, Code of Conduct: Ansätze zur vertraglichen Gestaltung internationaler 
Investitionen (Universitaets Verlag 1987); Emily F Carasco and Jang Singh, The United 
Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: Some Unresolved Issues 
(University of Windsor 1988); Daniel B Magraw, ‘United Nations ECOSOC Draft Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations’ in Stephen Zamora and Ronald A Brand (eds), 
Basic Documents of International Economic Law (Commerce Clearing House 1990) 533; 
A A Fatouros (ed), Transnational Corporations: The International Legal Framework 
(Routledge 1994); Ruth Rosenbaum, ‘In Whose Interest? A Global Code of Conduct for 
Corporations’ in Oliver Williams (ed), Global Codes of Conduct: An Idea whose Time has 
Come (University of Notre Dame Press 2000) 211–220; Cynthia Day Wallace, The 
Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State Sovereignty in an Era of Economic 
Globalization (Nijhofff 2002); and Khalil Hamdani, ‘Code of Conduct: Attempting an 
International Regulatory Framework’ in Hamdani and Rufffĳing (n 1). For UNCTC’s sum-
mary of the outstanding issues, see ‘Completion of the formulation of the Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations: Information paper on the negotiations’. Note by 
the Secretariat (E/C.10/1983/S/2, 4 January 1983). For a detailed analysis of the outstanding 
issues regarding the treatment provisions in the Code, see ‘Outstanding Issues in the Draft 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations’ (E/C.10/1985/S/2, 22 May 1985).
that the negotiations – covering a wide range of issues (box  1) – faced the 
immediate difffĳiculty of having to deal with a very complex range of issues 
without having had the benefĳit of being able to draw on extensive prepara-
tions. Moreover, negotiators could not rely on substantial experience of their 
own: apart from the relative small number of BITs that had been signed by the 
time the Code negotiations began (and that typically were very short and did 
not involve real negotiations) and the focused discussions on expropriation 
and permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the context of the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the NIEO resolutions, this was the 
fĳirst time that negotiators dealt comprehensively with international invest-
ment and the fĳirms undertaking such investment. The negotiations were there-
fore an exercise of ‘learning by doing,’ slowing down the process. To quote Sten 
Niklasson, the Chair of the Working Group: ‘As it played out in reality, most 
things happened more or less simultaneously and in great haste. Many coun-
tries came to meetings of the Commission and the Working Group having but 
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96 Communication by Sten Niklasson, (25 February 2014) (on fĳile with the author). In his 
opinion, a period of about ‘12–15 months .. of systematic preparation, including increased 
mental awaereness of what material negotiations might require, would have been sufffĳi-
cient.’ ibid.
97 Mousouris, in Hamdani and Rufffĳing (n 1).
98 Communication by the Chair of the Working Group, Sten Niklasson (9 February 2014) (on 
fĳile with the author). The idea of a balanced Code was already contained in the report of 
the Group of Eminent Persons, on the basis of which the Commission and Centre were 
established. More specifĳically, the Group noted that the Code should be ‘a set of recom-
mendations which could be prepared by the commission, and considered and approved 
by the Economic and Social Council. They should be addressed to both Governments and 
multinational corporations.’ See ‘Report of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the 
Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations’ 
(n 9) 55.
the faintest idea of the practical issues to be tackled.’96 Clearly, circumstances 
were very difffĳicult, and were further accentuated by the fact that a relatively 
large number of countries were involved.
In the beginning, negotiations focused on the guidelines, while ‘issues 
related to the treatment [of investors] and the legal nature [of the instrument] 
were not seriously discussed in the early years.’97 But it became clear in the 
course of the negotiations in the Working Group that, unless the Code would 
be a balanced instrument covering rules for both TNC behavior and govern-
ment treatment of such fĳirms, the negotiations could well collapse.98
box 1  Structure of the Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations*
PREAMBLE AND OBJECTIVES
DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION
ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A. General and political
Respect for national sovereignty and observance of domestic laws, regulations and 
administrative practices
Adherence to economic goals and development objectives, policies and priorities
Review and renegotiation of contracts
Adherence to socio-cultural objectives and values
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
Non-collaboration by transnational corporations with racist minority regimes in 
southern Africa
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99 The fĳirst fĳive provisions were agreed upon by the Working Group during its ninth session, 
17–28 March 1980.
Encouragingly, developing countries had obtained much of what they had 
sought concerning guidelines, as many of the guidelines for TNCs had been 
agreed upon in a relatively short time, even if not in as strong terms as they had 
sought:99 adherence to economic goals and development objectives, policies 
and priorities; adherence to socio-cultural objectives and values; respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms; non-collaboration by transnational 
corporations with racist minority regimes in southern Africa; ownership and 
Non-interference in internal political afffairs
Non-interference in intergovernmental relations
Abstention from corrupt practices
B. Economic, fĳinancial and social
Ownership and control
Balance of payments and fĳinancing
Transfer pricing
Taxation
Competition and restrictive business practices
Transfer of technology
Consumer protection
C. Disclosure of information
TREATMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A. General treatment of transnational corporations by the countries in which they 
operate
B. Nationalization and compensation
C. Jurisdiction
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT
A. Action at the national level
B. International institutional machinery
C. Review procedure
Source: Commission on Transnational Corporations, ‘Report on the Special Session (7–18 
March and 9–21 May 1983)’, Offfĳicial Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1983, 
Supplement No. 7 (E/1983/17/Rev. 1), Annex II.
* No fĳinal decision regarding the use and contents of headings and subheadings had been 
taken.
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100 Developing countries also used the negotiations to bring up difffĳicult political issues, espe-
cially regarding apartheid in South Africa, reflected in regular resolutions adopted by the 
Commission.
101 In comparison with the original OECD Guidelines, the Code had paragraphs on the 
review and renegotiation of contracts, the protection of the environment and consumers, 
respect for human rights, apartheid, non-interference, ownership and control, and trans-
fer pricing. Some of these issues were subsequently added to the Guidelines in the course 
of the review process of this instrument. Moreover, the United Nations Code was much 
more detailed on the disclosure of information and balance-of-payments issues. On the 
other hand, the Guidelines had provisions dealing with competition, employment and 
industrial relations, and science and technology (although the last two issues were envis-
aged to be dealt with via references to the ILO Declaration and the technology code under 
negotiations), however all were not dealt with in the Code.
control; taxation; competition and restrictive business practices; consumer 
protection; and disclosure of information. In the case of other topics, certain 
aspects were agreed upon (e.g., some issues related to the balance of payments 
and fĳinancing; transfer of technology), or depended on the resolution of provi-
sions elsewhere in the instrument (e.g., renegotiation of contracts). Agreement 
on the remaining guidelines, including on a reference to permanent sover-
eignty of states and non-interference by TNCs into the internal political afffairs 
of host countries (see the listing in box 1), seemed to be within reach.100
Developing countries were also not, in principle, against treatment provi-
sions: they had agreed to a number of them during the negotiations. But they 
had problems (reflecting that they were overwhelmingly host countries) with 
a number of such provisions (discussed below) that could limit their policy 
space to regulate foreign investors, and the fact that many of these provisions 
were couched in more precise legal language than the provisions providing 
guidelines for TNCs.
Developed countries, for their part, were not in principle against guidelines 
for TNCs (although some of them had reservations from the beginning), and 
the guidelines part of the instrument was largely agreed upon. This had been 
made easier by the fact that – as discussed earlier – developed countries 
had early on agreed amongst themselves, in the framework of the OECD, and 
partly to have a common bargaining position for the Code negotiations, on 
the voluntary OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The subse-
quent draft United Nations Code text generally did not go much beyond what 
had already been agreed in the context of these Guidelines.101 Moreover, the 
constellation of governments was favorable for the Code negotiations: during 
the second half of the 1970s, social democratic parties were in power in 
Germany and the United Kingdom (and, beginning in 1981, in France), and 
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102 Trade unions generally supported a multilateral approach as they knew, from their own 
experience, that efffective interaction with TNCs would be greatly helped by access to 
international information as well as by consultation arrangements within individual 
TNCs (including in the framework of worker world councils), and to have access to 
an international complaint mechanism: ‘It is the trade union view that implementation 
[of international codes] at the enterprise level is necessary to deal with the normal 99 out 
of 100 cases, as opposed to the exceptional one in 100 cases which may be discussed at the 
level of the responsible international organization.’ Stephen K Pursey, ‘The Trade Union 
view on the Implementation of Codes of Conduct’ in Horn (n 60) 278. See also Kari 
Tapiola, ‘The Review of the OECD Guidelines: A Trade Union Evaluation’ in Horn (n 60) 
291–293. Trade unions had also formulated their own code of conduct for TNCs; see 
ICFTU, ‘Multinational Charter’, IFTU Doc D/1976/0403/13.
103 Communication by Marino Baldi (13 January 2014) (on fĳile with the author). The idea was 
that, if a code could not be prevented, one should engage constructively in the negotia-
tions and make the best out of them. In the case of some countries (eg Switzerland), this 
approach was furthered by a desire to protect one’s own TNCs (see the observation made 
earlier about the legitimacy of these enterprises in light of world-wide criticism) and fre-
quent interactions with stakeholders, some of whom supported a code.
104 Henry Kissinger, ‘International Law, World Order, and Human Progress’. Address by 
Secretary Kissinger made before the American Bar Association at Montreal and Quebec, 
Canada on 11 August 1975 (Department of State Bulletin, vol 73, No 1889, 8 September 
1975), 361. It should be noted, however, that Kissinger also stated that ‘[a] multilateral 
treaty establishing binding rules for multinational enterprises does not seem possible in 
the near future.’ ibid.
the Democrats in the United States. These countries, together with a few oth-
ers, especially Switzerland and the Netherlands, were not only important 
home countries (and hence had a special interest in the treatment of their 
TNCs), but their governments were close to trade unions – and trade unions 
were keenly aware of the challenges that TNCs presented to them in terms of 
collective bargaining with fĳirms that could potentially shift production, and 
hence employment, abroad.102 Other Western European governments were 
supportive as well – some on the basis of the approach ‘If you can’t beat them, 
join them.’103 But even before the Carter administration, United States 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had stated publicly in 1975 that his govern-
ment ‘was prepared to make a major efffort’ to arrive at ‘an agreed statement 
of basic principles’,104 reflecting the interests of the largest home country in 
deflecting criticism of TNCs. He later elaborated in a speech to the United 
Nations General Assembly that:
The United States therefore believes that the time has come for the 
international community to articulate standards of conduct for both 
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105 Henry Kissinger, ‘Global Consensus and Economic Development’. Address by US Secretary 
of State to the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, delivered 
on 1 September 1975 by Daniel P Moynihan, US Representative to the United Nations 
(Department of State Bulletin, vol 73, No 1891, 22 September 1975) 432–433 (Kissinger 
made similar statements on other occasions). Kissinger continued to lay out a number of 
parameters for such an instrument, the fĳirst two of which were: ‘_Transnational enter-
prises are obliged to obey local laws and refrain from unlawful intervention in the domes-
tic afffairs of host countries. Their activities should take account of public policy and and 
national development priorities. They should respect local customs. They should employ 
qualifĳied local personnel, or qualify local people through training. – Host governments in 
turn must treat transnational corporations equitably, without discrimination among 
them, and in accordance with international law…’ ibid.
enterprises and government… We must reach agreement on balanced 
principles. These should apply to transnational enterprises in their rela-
tions with governments, and to governments in their relations with 
enterprises and with other governments. They must be fair principles, for 
failure to reflect the interests of all parties concerned would exacerbate 
rather than moderate the frictions which have damaged the environment 
for international investment.105
In any event, representatives of important developed countries participated 
actively in the negotiations. Reflecting their position as the principal home 
countries, and in spite of some sympathies on the part of some governments 
for a voluntary code, they were particularly interested in strong investment 
protection provisions. As mentioned earlier, at a minimum, they wanted to 
avoid a weakening of the existing standards of customary international law; if 
anything, they wanted to afffĳirm and strengthen these standards.
Accordingly, the negotiations of the treatment aspect of the instrument 
during the later time of the Working Group revolved around a number of key 
investment protections, and negotiations became considerably more difffĳicult. 
None of the treatment provisions (see box 1) were fully agreed upon, although 
parts of them were. At the same time, not all open issues involved equally dif-
fĳicult matters. Pride of place among the difffĳicult provisions belonged to the 
over-arching efffort of developed countries to obtain a confĳirmation of custom-
ary international (investment) law, i.e., that there was a body of universally 
recognized principles and rules of international law reflecting a minimum 
standard for the treatment of foreign investors and investments. Developing 
countries rejected such a confĳirmation, among other things because they had 
not participated in the creation of this law. In this context, particularly the 
Latin American countries (adherents of the Calvo Doctrine at that time) 
0002252332.INDD   45 1/13/2015   1:55:56 PM
46 Sauvant
the journal of world investment & trade 16 (2015) 11-87
301394
106 See n 10. There, the issue was worded as follows in Article 2(c): ‘Each State has the right … 
[t]o nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case 
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking 
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State consid-
ers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, 
it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, 
unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means 
be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the 
principle of free choice of means.’ Note, however, that the Charter was not adopted by 
consensus.
insisted that foreign investors should not be treated diffferently from national 
investors; rather, the treatment of both should be governed by national law 
(subject to any international agreements freely entered into by individual 
states), implying, among other things, that foreign investors need not have 
access to international dispute settlement. For developed countries, on the 
other hand, access to international arbitration in the case of disputes between 
foreign investors and host country governments was of key importance.
This controversy played itself out in provisions dealing with specifĳic stan-
dards of treatment. The discussions focused on how the fundamental ‘national 
treatment’ standard should be qualifĳied and whether fair, equitable and non-
discriminatory treatment should be provided not only in accordance with 
national law but also international law. Such a broad standard went too far for 
developing countries, partly because of the reference to international law. 
Another very controversial standard concerned nationalization, an issue that 
had just recently been hotly debated in the context of the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States adopted in December 1974.106 While developing 
countries insisted on formulations close to those in the Charter, including the 
sufffĳiciency of ‘adequate compensation’ and dispute settlement only under 
domestic law (providing a number of specifĳications), developed countries 
insisted, among other things, on ‘prompt, adequate and efffective’ compensa-
tion under international law (enumerating elements that needed to be taken 
into account).
Moreover, there were a few other difffĳicult issues that were of overarching 
importance. One was the legal nature of the Code (binding vs. voluntary, and 
reflected in the usage of ‘should/shall’ brackets in the text of the draft): devel-
oping countries sought binding guidelines, but did not want to agree to bind-
ing treatment provisions, especially when developed countries sought to make 
them what developing countries at that time considered onerous. Since it was 
clear that the basic quid pro quo for an agreement was the trade-offf between 
guidelines for fĳirms and treatment standards for host country governments, 
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107 Tapiola (n 64). As noted earlier, however, the ILO one year later adopted the Tripartite 
Declaration; although voluntary, it also contained references to a number of ILO conven-
tions that were binding for those governments that had ratifĳied the conventions in ques-
tion, and it established a follow-up mechanism.
108 The discussion regarding TNCs in the summary report of the Conference stated that 
members of the Workers’ Group felt that ‘it was necessary that a code of conduct should 
be elaborated at the international level defĳining the obligations of multinational enter-
prises. This code should take into account notably the principles and measures presented 
by the workers’ members. It should have a legal and binding form.’ It also stated that 
members of the Group of 77 ‘recommended that the ILO and member States co-operate 
with a view to bringing the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations to consider 
among the points to be in the compulsory Code of Conduct of TNCs those concerning the 
obligation of these enterprises to hire local labour …’ In contrast, the members of the 
Employers’ Group expressed that a ‘voluntary code could be helpful.’ The Employers’ 
members felt that an efffective Convention would not be helpful unless the guidelines 
were ‘non-mandatory’, and that they do not bind multinationals to observance of ILO 
standards. See International Labour Offfĳice, Meeting Basic Needs: Strategies for Eradicating 
Mass Poverty and Unemployment. Conclusions of the World Employment Conference 
1976 (ILO 1977).
109 Interview with Sotirios Mousouris (9 December 2013) and Marino Baldi (2 December 
2013). Apart from political considerations, a binding (ie, legally enforceable) instrument 
would have raised all sorts of complicated issues, including with respect to investigation, 
the collection and assessment of facts and penalties. While negotiating a voluntary 
instrument could and should have made reaching an agreement easier, in the case of the 
United States, however, there was a fear that even a voluntary instrument, as soft law, 
could potentially be used in that country’s courts against fĳirms. For a general discussion 
of the ways in which soft law principles ‘harden’ over time and are used a gap-fĳilling mea-
sure in United States jurisdicitons, one author used the Sullivan and MacBride principles 
as an example: ‘The Principles have, however, been drawn on as guidelines by state and 
local governments in the USA for investment, procurement or other purposes, and in 
that very limited sense they may be considered to have been incorporated into law 
by reference in certain jurisdictions. They have never, however, been drawn on for these 
making the treatment standards too demanding would decrease the interest of 
developing countries in an instrument. Conversely, making the treatment 
standards too weak and the guidelines too strong (and binding) would decrease 
the interest of the developed countries in an instrument. The position of the 
developed countries in this respect was foreshadowed in the nature of the 1976 
OECD Declaration, as well as by the fact that the proposal of the Workers’ 
Group in the ILO to formulate a binding convention ‘went down in flames’107 
during the 1976 World Employment Conference.108 Although the question was 
not resolved until the end of the negotiations, it was tacitly expected that the 
resulting instrument would be voluntary.109 To a certain extent, this issue was 
0002252332.INDD   47 1/13/2015   1:55:56 PM
48 Sauvant
the journal of world investment & trade 16 (2015) 11-87
301394
purposes in any other non-US jurisdiction, national or international. The Principles, then, 
are not in themselves soft law, though they may be said to have become soft law in some 
US jurisdictions through incorporation in governmental decision-making.’ Christopher 
McCrudden, ‘Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: What Can the Sullivan 
and MacBride Principles Tell Us?’ (1999) 19:2 OJLS 199.
110 ECOSOC Res. E/1980/60, para 6(a), United Nations document E/RES/1980/80/Add.1 
(24 July 1980).
111 At the 1983 special session of the Commission on Transnational Corporations, the Chair 
of the Working Group presented a package proposal that also contained language on 
‘Defĳinitions and scope of application’, with a footnote saying ‘[r]egarding the concerns 
that have been expressed by some delegations on certain points in this package, it was felt 
that they could be dealt with by reflecting them in the report.’ See Commission on Trans-
national Corporations, ‘Report on the Special Session (7–18 March and 9–12 May 1983)’ 
sidestepped by seeking to make the United Nations Code ‘efffective, compre-
hensive, widely accepted, and universally adopted’110 – which underlined, in 
turn, the importance of the implementation mechanism.
Implementation of the Code was, indeed, a controversial issue, especially 
the strength of the implementation mechanism. There was agreement on 
action at the national level, the role of the Commission as the focal interna-
tional body within the United Nations system for all matters related to the 
Code and the role of UNCTC in providing assistance relating to the implemen-
tation of the Code. But other provisions remained open. From the perspective 
of developing countries, a strong international implementation mechanism 
was desirable for the guidelines aspect of the instrument. From the perspec-
tive of developed countries, it was a good thing for the treatment aspect of the 
instrument – and vice versa: a strong implementation mechanism was unde-
sirable for developing countries as far as treatment was concerned, and it was 
undesirable for developed countries as far as the guidelines were concerned. In 
the end, the second set of considerations prevailed, and agreement could not 
be reached. For the developed countries, even a weak implementation mecha-
nism, patterned on the OECD Guidelines, was problematic, as it could create a 
‘slippery slope’ and, eventually, could lead to the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations acquiring quasi-judicial powers and becoming a tribunal in 
which ‘their’ fĳirms would be put in the dock, even if the instrument itself would 
be a voluntary one.
Finally, the provisions dealing with defĳinitions and scope of application as 
well as intergovernmental cooperation were outstanding. As to the former, the 
key issue was whether the instrument should apply only to private enterprises 
or also to state-owned enterprises, i.e., whether or not the United Nations 
Code should be universal; the issue was never formally resolved.111 As to the 
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ECOSOC, E/1983/17/Rev 1, 30. However, ‘some delegations emphasized that, in their view, 
it should be made clear that all enterprises, irrespective of their country of origin and 
form of ownership, should be explicitly covered.’ ibid 2. For a review of the discussions 
concerning the defĳinition, see Dell (n 1).
The defĳinition question, under the heading of ‘universality’, impacted not only the 
negotiations of the Code but also the relationship between UNCTC and especially the 
United States in the mid-1980s. The issue was whether a Code, as well as UNCTC’s work, 
would cover all fĳirms that controlled assets abroad, regardless of the nature of their own-
ership (the position of the developed countries and especially the United States, on the 
strength of the argument that it is not ownership that matters but behavior and impact) 
or only non-state-owned enterprises (the position of the socialist countries, on the 
strength of the argument that state-owned enterprises were not only commercial entities 
but also served broader societal goals and, in any event, were subject to government con-
trol concerning their behavior). Initially, it appears that France and Italy were also some-
what hesitant to include state-owned enterprises, given the importance of these fĳirms 
in their economies. Communication by Marjan Svetlicic (4 January 2014) (on fĳile with 
the author).
In 1986, at the time when Ambassador Alan L Keyes represented the United States at 
the United Nations in New York, the ‘universality’ issue became one reason for which the 
United States was seen as no longer broadly supporting the work of UNCTC. To quote 
Juliana Geran Pilon, from a publication prepared for the Heritage Foundation, a conserva-
tive think tank in Washington DC, on this issue: ‘The double standard on TNCs [referrring 
to the possible excemption of state-owned enterprise] is the principal reason why for 
more than a year the U.S. has distanced itself from the CTC.’ Juliana Geran Pilon, ‘The 
Centre on Transnational Corporations: How the UN Injures Poor Nations’ (Heritage 
Foundation 1987) Backgrounder no 608, 4. Consequently, Pilon concluded: ‘The time 
now has come for the US to cease participation in the CTC altogether.’ ibid 11.
It is somewhat ironic that, 35 years later, the United States, as well as other developed 
countries, seem to depart from the universality principle of rules for foreign investors by 
seeking separate rules for state-owned enterprises, eg in the context of the Trans-Pacifĳic 
Partnership negotiations. This reflects the rise of state-owned enterprises as out-
ward  investors from emerging markets, and especially China, although state-owned 
enterprises  headquartered in developed countries control considerably more assets 
abroad than those headquartered in emerging markets; see Karl P Sauvant and Jonathan 
Strauss, ‘State-Controlled Entities Control Nearly US 2 Trillion in Foreign Assets’ (2012) 
64 Columbia FDI Perspective <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/fĳiles/2014/01/FDI_64.pdf> 
accessed 14 September 2014. UNCTC, in its work, dealt with all enterprises; see eg 
UNCTC, Trends and Issues in Foreign Direct Investment and Related Flows (UNCTC 1985), 
which devoted one of its chapters to FDI in and from socialist countries.
intergovernmental cooperation provisions, consensus depended largely upon 
the decision regarding the legal nature of the resulting instrument.
While the draft text contained many brackets, and the positions on a num-
ber of the key outstanding issues appeared insurmountable, the Chair of the 
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112 Presentation of the Chair of the Working Group, Sten Niklasson, to the eighth session of 
the Commission on Transnational Corporations, quoted in E/C.10/1983/S/2. See also ‘The 
United Nations Code of Conduct on TNCs’ (1983) 14 The CTC Reporter 9–10.
113 Presentation of the Chair of the Working Group, Sten Niklasson, to the eighth session of 
the Commission on Transnational Corporations, 9.
114 ibid.
115 While not resolved, there were signs that the socialist countries were prepared to accept 
a defĳinition that could have covered state-owned enterprises, even if not explicitly so.
116 Additional issues that were relatively complicated included non-interference in internal 
political afffairs and transfers of payments by TNCs. See also the discussion by Asante, 
‘The January 1986 Reconvened Special Session’ (n 95).
117 See Asante (n 95) 28–30. But some, eg in the United States, saw a real diffference between 
‘international obligations’ and ‘international law’, with the former being obligations that 
individual governments could decide to accept or not to accept, and the latter referring to 
Working Group pointed out, when he submitted the draft Code to the 
Commission in 1982,112 that ‘[m]ore than half of the bracketed paragraphs con-
tain brackets which could be removed without great efffort’113 (e.g., brackets that 
contained alternatives such as ‘refrain from’ versus ‘not resort to’) while the 
resolution of other brackets depended on matters to be resolved elsewhere.
He further opined that there were only ‘fĳive or six hard core difffĳiculties’ 
that needed to be resolved,114 and these were the real sticking points in the 
negotiations. More specifĳically, the most difffĳicult issues that were outstand-
ing included (not counting the question of implementation and defĳini-
tion),115 provisions relating to international law/obligations; national 
treatment and fair and equitable treatment; nationalization and compensa-
tion; settlement of disputes; jurisdiction; and respect for national sover-
eignty.116 The difffĳiculty to reach consensus on these interlinked provisions 
reflected precisely the diffferent underlying interest situations, and hence 
objectives, of developed countries as the principal home countries seeking a 
strong and unambiguous role for international investment law versus the 
interests of developing countries as the principal host countries seeking to 
preserve as much as possible of their sovereign right to deal with TNCs 
according to their own laws and regulations.
Finding the right balance between these objectives could have been a pos-
sibility as there were compromise suggestions on the table that appeared to 
command wide support, including within the group of developed countries. 
For example, it appears that developing countries and most developed coun-
tries could have accepted a general provision requiring countries to fulfĳill 
in good faith their ‘international obligations’ instead of having a reference 
to ‘international law’.117 Overall, all agreed provisions were agreed upon 
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legal standards to be observed by all. As regards national treatment, Marino Baldi, the 
Chair of the Western Group, thought that a compromise seemed to be quite possible 
(interview with Marino Baldi, 2 December 2013).
118 International investment agreements typically have included broadly-worded key con-
cepts that become only more concrete in the course of the interpretation by arbitration 
tribunals.
119 Upon a decision of ECOSOC resolution 1982/68 of 27 October 1982.
120 The Special Session of the Commission met 7–18 March, 9–21 May 1983; 9–13 January, 
11–29 June 1984; 17–21 June 1985; 20–31 January, 14 April 1986; 6 April 1987; and 24 May 1990.
121 For the draft text of the United Nations Code, as it stood at the end of the negotiations in 
the Intergovernmental Working Group and the end of the 1983 Special Session of the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations (reflecting open issues through brackets) see 
Commission on Transnational Corporations, ‘Report on the Special Session (7–18 March 
and 9–21 May 1983)’ (E/1983/17/Rev 1, 1983, Supplement No 7) Annexes II and III. The text 
is also reproduced in UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium. 
Volume I: Multilateral Instruments (UNCTAD 1996) 161–180. While negotiations contin-
ued, this text reflects the furthest level of consensus reached at the level of the 
Commission. It should be noted, though, that further progress was made by the Bureau of 
the June 1985 reconvened Special Session of the Commission. But at the January 1986 
Special Session, it was explicitly noted (para 8) that it would ‘be misleading to assume 
that a consensus was reached on any particular formulation’. See Commission on 
ad referendum: as customary in international negotiations, nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed. With some constructive interpretive ambiguity,118 
the United Nations Code – and with it the fĳirst comprehensive multilateral 
instrument dealing with investment – appeared within reach.
It was not to be. The negotiations were never successfully concluded – they 
fĳizzled out. Negotiations had been particularly intensive during the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s and were progressing relatively well when the Intergovern-
mental Working Group on a Code of Conduct met twice annually between 
1977 and 1982. When the draft Code was passed on from the Working Group to 
the Commission in 1982, two-thirds of its 71 provisions (see box 1 – not count-
ing the section on preamble and objectives) were fully agreed. The remaining 
provisions had brackets, indicating that disagreement existed (while providing 
alternative formulations) – sometimes signaling strong disagreement, while 
sometimes fĳinal agreement was dependent on how other matters were settled 
within the text.
With a view toward resolving important outstanding issues, negotiations 
were even elevated119 to special sessions of the Commission on Transnational 
Corporation, open to the participation of all states, in 1983 (until 1990).120 
During the 1983 special sessions, progress was made on a number of provisions, 
resulting in a draft text with fewer brackets, indicating open issues.121 But no 
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Transnational Corporations, ‘Report on the Reconvened Special Session (20–31 January 
1986)’ (E/1986/50, 14 February 1986) para 8.
122 The January 1986 Special Session of the Commission had before it various texts, including 
suggestions for the solution of the outstanding issues proposed by the Bureau of the June 
1985 reconvened Special Session. Such texts dealt with: fair and equitable treatment; a 
general provision on the interrelatedness of the Code’s provisions; observance of domes-
tic laws; and jurisdiction. However, none of these suggestions were given formal status 
in the Special Session’s report. See Commission on Transnational Corporations, ‘Report 
on the Reconvened Special Session (20–31 January 1986)’ (E/1986/50, 14 February 1986). 
See also The CTC Reporter (n 95) 18.
123 The joint statement is reproduced in (1985) 20 The CTC Reporter 18–19. The names of the 
Expert Advisers can be found there as well.
124 Esther Peterson, the representative of the International Organization of Consumers, 
arranged for Hearings on the status of the Code negotiations held by the Subcommittee 
on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Afffairs, 
United States House of Representatives, on 7 May 1987; Peter Hansen (who was UNCTC’s 
last Executive Director, serving from 1985–1992, and the highest-ranking UNCTC stafff 
responsible for the Code negotiations) was in the audience and was called upon to clarify 
certain issues that were discussed; see ‘Congressional Support for the Code’ (1987) 24 The 
CTC Reporter 31–36, including excerpts from the testimonies. The same Subcommittee 
held Hearings again on 15 November 1989, in which a number of eminent personalities 
further progress was made after that date, at least at the level of agreement 
with a formal status,122 despite a number of additional Special Sessions and 
various other effforts.
Rather, negotiations began to slow down after 1983. The Commission’s 
Expert Advisers made a special efffort to help bring about a fĳinal compromise, 
as did the Secretariat, the Chair of the Special Session of the Commission, and 
the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations. To no avail.
The Expert Advisers to the Commission played an important role. This was a 
group of eminent personalities, appointed in their personal capacity from busi-
ness, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, and academia; they hailed 
from developed, developing and socialist countries. They met on their own dur-
ing the June 1985 reconvened Special Session of the Commission to seek com-
promise texts for the principal outstanding issues. They succeeded in doing so 
on the basis of the assumption that the Code would be non-mandatory,123  
indicating that it was feasible among diffferent stakeholders to arrive at consen-
sus. These formulations were subsequently submitted to the Special Session of 
the Commission. The submission of the Expert Advisers helped interested del-
egates, but, in the end, did not unblock the negotiations. Individual ‘Friends of 
the Centre’ also sought to help in other ways, e.g., by arranging for Hearings in 
the United States Congress.124
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testifĳied; see ‘Congressional Hearings on the Code’ (1990) 29 The CTC Reporter 1–14 
(including excerpts from the experts’ statements). Peterson also arranged for such 
Hearings in the United States Congress Senate Foreign Afffairs Committee on 11 October 
1990; see 2:3 Transnationals 1–2 (Quarterly Newsletter of the United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations). Finally, Peterson arranged for the author of this article to be 
an Expert Witness in the Hearings on ‘Foreign direct investment’ (on the United Nations 
Code) of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, Washington 
DC, 13 May 1992 (special permission by the United Nations was required to accept this 
invitation to testify as Expert Witness).
125 For the ‘General Reflections on the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations’ adopted by the Roundtable, as well as the list of participants, see (1986) 22 
The CTC Reporter 9–10. The Roundtable did not put forward any joint concrete proposals. 
As Victoria Aranda observed: ‘As on previous occasions in the last three years, the political 
will to fĳind a solution to the outstanding issues in the negotiations on the Code was 
absent.’ See Victoria Aranda, ‘The Thirteenth Session of the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations: Highlights’ (1987) 24 The CTC Reporter, ibid 3.
126 For the outcome of that symposium (as well as the list of participants) see (1990) Reporter 
(n 124) 26–27.
127 Convened on the initiative of UNCTC’s Executive Director at that time, Peter Hansen, 
these meetings also illustrate the activist approach that the Centre took to help move the 
negotiations along.
128 See (1986) Reporter (n 95) 20.
Similarly, various effforts by UNCTC – which throughout the negotiations 
had prepared numerous supporting documents, had actively supported the 
Chair of the negotiations, and had provided technical advice especially to 
developing country negotiators – did not lead to a breakthrough. For example, 
an informal roundtable in Montreux organized by UNCTC in October 1986 
brought together key negotiators and others to assist the Commission to reach 
agreement on the Code.125 Another such meeting, also organized by UNCTC, 
in The Hague (Netherlands) in September 1989, involved prominent interna-
tional lawyers as well as key negotiators.126 Both meetings sought to move the 
negotiations forward on a number of important outstanding issues, but nei-
ther succeeded.127 Meetings were also organized by the United Nations’ 
regional economic commissions for Africa, Asia and the Pacifĳic, Western Asia, 
and Latin America and the Caribbean during the last quarter in 1985, in prepa-
ration for the Commission’s Special Session in January 1985.128
In a last-ditch attempt, the Chair of the Special Session of the Commission, 
Miguel Marin-Bosch (Mexico), sought to arrive at a fĳinal compromise text:
In May 1990, towards the end of what turned out to be the last meeting 
of the reconvened special session of the Commission, I requested the 
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129 Miguel Marin-Bosch, ‘An Odorless Code’ in Hamdani and Rufffĳing (n 1) (Marin-Bosch was 
Deputy Permanent Representative and then Permanent Representative of Mexico to the 
United Nations in New York during the Code negotiations and, in 1984, became the Chair 
of the Special Session of the Commission on Transnational Corporations).
130 Letter dated 31 May 1990 from the Chairman of the reconvened special session of the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations to the President of the Economic and Social 
Council transmitting a proposed text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations (E/1990/94) (Report of the Economic and Social Council for the Year 1990, 
United Nations New York 1991 (A/45/3/Rev1) 48–49).
131 Marin-Bosch (n 129).
132 As the Heritage Foundation put it: ‘A much more important objection is that the Code is 
designed to force Western companies to operate according to the New International 
Economic Order – or NIEO – the UN’s prescription for mandatory resource transfers from 
the West to the developing world.’ Pilon (n 111) 2.
133 Quoted in John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (CUP 2000) 193.
members of the Western European and Others Group to share with 
me the wording of the outstanding issues that would be acceptable to 
them. I then incorporated the language suggested, especially by the 
delegates of the U.K. and the U.S., into my own draft code and circulated 
the revised text.129
But even that text130 was not acceptable to key developed countries: ‘the draft 
code of conduct, even as amended, simply “did not smell right”.’131 For the 
Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular – but 
also for those of some other developed countries that conveniently left the 
lead to the United States – the United Nations Code had simply become anach-
ronistic and unacceptable, a proxy for the discussions relating to a New 
International Economic Order which they wanted to be over with for good.132 
To quote from a demarche that the United States Government had sent in 
March 1991 to the countries embassies abroad, asking embassy stafff to lobby 
for the termination of the Code negotiations:
We believe that the Code is a relic of another era, when foreign direct 
investment was looked upon with considerable concern. The Code 
does not reflect the current investment policies of many developing 
countries. … In light of the above, Washington agencies have decided to 
seek the support of host government offfĳicials responsible for foreign 
investment and quietly build a consensus against further negotiations. … 
We stress that the Demarche should be given to offfĳicials responsible for 
investment not/not those responsible for UN afffairs.133
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134 Communication by Miguel Marin-Bosch (26 February 2014) (on fĳile with the author).
135 As requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 45/186 of 21 December 1991. The 
report of the President is contained in document A/46/558 and Corr1 of 16 October 1991.
136 Interview with Farooq Sobhan (4 March 2014).
137 See ‘Report of the Economic and Social Council: Note by the Secretary-General’ (A/47/446, 
15 September 1992).
138 Para 14 of the draft resolution ‘Strengthening the Role of the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations’ contained in the ‘Report of the Commission on Transnational Corporations 
on its Nineteenth Seession (5–15 April 1993)’ (E/1993/30, 9 June 1993).
139 ECOSOC resolution 1993/49 (29 July 1993) para 14.
In any event, it is not at all clear whether the Chair’s text would have been 
acceptable to developing countries (especially in Latin America), considering 
that the key outstanding issues had all been resolved along the lines of solu-
tions proposed by developed countries. As Marin-Bosch put it: ‘The developing 
countries did not voice an opinion on my “developed country” text. The dia-
logue was between the Chair and the US and UK delegates. When those two 
delegations voiced their opposition and the Eastern Group said nothing, there 
was really no need to fĳind out what the G-77 thought.’134 For all practical pur-
poses, this signaled the end of the Code negotiations.
Not surprisingly, therefore, a subsequent special consultation efffort by the 
President of the General Assembly of the United Nations135 during 1991 did not 
lead to further progress. An additional round of informal consultations took 
place during 21–23 July 1992, conducted by Farooq Sobhan (Bangladesh), 
the Chair of the eighteenth session of the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations, on behalf of the President of the General Assembly. The Chair 
concluded: ‘It became clear in the course of the consultations that neither the 
developed nor the developing countries were any longer interested in continu-
ing the negotiations. There was therefore no way we could obtain an intergov-
ernmental Code.’136 Accordingly, the President of the General Assembly 
reported in September 1992 that: ‘It was the view of delegations that no con-
sensus was possible on the draft code at present. Delegations felt that the 
changed international economic environment and the importance attached to 
encouraging foreign investment required that a fresh approach should be 
examined…’137 In light of this, the Commission on Transnational Corporations, 
during its nineteenth session in April 1993, requested ECOSOC to adopt a reso-
lution to take note ‘of the results of the consultations on the draft code of con-
duct on transnational corporations held by the President of the General 
Assembly from 21 to 23 July 1992.’138 With ECOSOC endorsing the draft,139  
this marked the formal end of the negotiations of a United Nations Code 
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. Negotiators never managed to 
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140 Negotiations under the umbrella of the United Nations General Assembly can easily 
become more politicized than in other fora. The 1970s (but less so during the 1980s) were 
particularly politically charged on account of the NIEO discussions.
141 Marino Baldi, eg argued that aiming for a comprehensive investment instrument makes 
it very difffĳicult to reach agreement, especially if it seeks to cover both protection and lib-
eralization; see ‘Are Trade-law Inspired Investment Rules Desirable?’ (2013) 105 Columbia 
FDI Perspectives <http:://ccsi.columbia.edu/fĳiles/2014/01/FDI_105.pdf> accessed 14 
September 2014.
142 Recall that even in the context of the OECD it had not been possible to negotiate a bind-
ing instrument in 1976, at the height of the criticism of TNCs. Even the earlier OECD efffort 
to adopt a ‘Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property’ did not succeed (the draft 
is reproduced in (1968) 7 ILM 117–143 Similarly, the later efffort to negotiate a binding 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the OECD came to naught.
reconcile, or did not want to reconcile, the diffferent underlying interest situa-
tions of developed and developing countries.
5 Why the Failure?
Perhaps ambitions were too high, perhaps the agenda of subjects to be tackled 
was beyond what was possible, perhaps one ought to have dealt with the most 
difffĳicult issues at the beginning (when pressure was the highest), perhaps the 
venue was not the right one,140 perhaps it is too much to deal with such a com-
plex topic in one instrument, or perhaps key countries simply did not consider 
any possible trade-offf as satisfactory given the diffferent underlying interest 
situations of developed and developing countries and the objectives flowing 
from them. It is certainly a formidable challenge to negotiate a comprehensive 
multilateral instrument on such a complex and difffĳicult subject as interna-
tional investment, especially if it seeks to cover both, protection and liberaliza-
tion,141 let alone guidelines for fĳirms. This challenge is further accentuated 
by the fact that foreign investment is very intrusive as it involves the entire 
range of issues related to the production process within national economies 
(and FDI has the additional baggage of being ‘foreign’). The efffort could per-
haps only have succeeded if both country groups had a strong vested interest 
in the success of the negotiations, and even then only as a voluntary 
instrument.142
Most importantly, however, as the negotiations slowed down and became 
drawn out, the interest in a United Nations Code cooled because regula-
tory,  economic and political macro-level circumstances were unfolding that 
changed the interests of developed and developing countries in a multilateral 
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143 This concept was used by UNCTC as far back as 1990; see UNCTC (n 92). UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report 1996: Investment, Trade and International Policy Arrangements 
(UNCTAD 1996) 181 (used ‘international investment agreements’).
144 Only BITs still in efffect in 2013. Courtesy UNCTAD Secretariat.
145 ibid.
146 ibid; see also UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs. An Action Plan 
(UNCTAD 2014) 114.
147 UNCTAD (n 146) 124. This number might appear low, considering that there are more 
than 100,000 MNEs and more than one million foreign afffĳiliates, each of which, depend-
ing on the availability of an IIA and its provisions, could potentially initiate dispute pro-
ceedings. On the other hand, the number of disputes on which panel reports were issued 
during the existence of the GATT from 1948 to the end of 1994 (when the WTO came into 
existence) amounted to only 91. See Karl P Sauvant, ‘Driving and Countervailing Forces: 
A Rebalancing of National FDI Policies’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy 2008–2009 (OUP 2009) 215, 259. It is important to note that there 
is of course an important diffference between the WTO dispute-settlement regime and the 
IIA dispute-settlement regime: in the case of the former only states can initiate disputes, 
while in the case of the latter only investors can do that. Additionally, the large number of 
TNCs and their foreign afffĳiliates, combined with the large number of IIAs and a broad 
defĳinition of ‘investment’, also indicates that there is a considerable potential for future 
disputes, underlining the importance of the dispute-settlement mechanism and explain-
ing to a certain extent the concern of governments and others in this area.
instrument that would establish norms for international investors and the 
treatment of those investors.
Instead, international investment agreements (IIAs143 – particularly BITs, 
to which one has to add other international agreements that contain substan-
tial investment provisions) focused, and continue to focus, on what was, at 
that time, the single most important objective of the developed countries: 
to protect the investment of their investors abroad by establishing manda-
tory  standards of treatment of foreign investors by the governments of 
host countries, subject to binding dispute settlement through interna-
tional arbitration. By the end of the 1980s, 371 BITs had been negotiated144 and 
by the end of the 1990s 1,862.145 By the end of 2013, that fĳigure had reached 
2,902 BITs and 334 other IIAs.146 In their totality, IIAs constitute a powerful 
protective mechanism for foreign investors, as witnessed by the rising number 
of treaty-based international investment disputes, which, cumulatively, had 
reached at least 568 by the end of 2013.147 Moreover, the scope of these trea-
ties, at least in the case of a number of important developed home countries, 
gradually expanded beyond protection to include various liberalizing provi-
sions, particularly national treatment at the pre-establishment phase of an 
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148 However, effforts to enshrine investment protections inter-regionally did not succeed: as 
already noted, the idea to adopt an OECD ‘Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property’ and negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that would be 
open to other countries came to naught. The same applies to effforts to negotiate an 
investment agreement in the framework of the WTO. For a discussion of why the MAI 
negotiations failed, see Edward M Graham, Fighting the Wrong Enemy: Antiglobal Activists 
and Multinational Enterprises (Peterson Institute 2000); Charan Devereaux, Robert Z 
Lawrence and Michael Watkins, Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation, Making the Rules 
(Institute for International Economics 2006) vol 1; UNCTAD, Lessons from the MAI. 
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (United Nations 1999). 
A part of the documentation related to the MAI negotiations <http://www.oecd.org/daf/
mai/>accessed 14 September 2014.
149 However, the later MAI drafts included provisions on the non-lowering of environmental 
and social standards and references to the OECD Guidelines, as do a number of post-2000 
BITs.
150 This change in the ideological approach also had implications for the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises: beginning in the mid-1980s and especially during the 1990s, 
fewer cases/issues were brought to the OECD’s Committee on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises (CIME). The Guidelines appeared to be moribund, and the 
separate Working Group on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises dealing with 
cases was abolished by combining it with another. Only with the 2000 review of the 
Guidelines did this instrument obtain new vitality. A separate Working Party dedicated to 
dealing with the Guidelines was re-established only in 2013, the Working Party on 
Responsible Business Conduct.
151 The support of the socialist countries had, however, been a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, these countries provided rhetorical support for the developing countries, 
claiming at the same time that they themselves were neither home nor host countries 
to TNCs, and thus in reality not afffected by the whole exercise. On the other hand, to 
quote Guttorm Vik, ‘the unnatural and unholy alliance often prevailing between the G77 
[the developing countries] and Group D [the socialist countries] during the code negotia-
tions annoyed the hell out of the developed countries and reinforced the resolve of 
investment.148 The rise of BITs furthered the demise of the United Nations 
Code as BITs provided developed countries with the strongest possible manda-
tory protection for their investors without any guidelines for fĳirms,149 as well as 
a dispute-settlement mechanism that would enforce this protection.
Moreover, while the number of IIAs rose, the ideological climate changed in 
developed countries. With the election of Prime Minster Thatcher in the 
United Kingdom in 1979 and President Reagan in the United States in 1980, free 
market principles began to dominate. Guidelines for fĳirms, let alone manda-
tory ones, were no longer in the cards – in fact, they became anathema.150 And 
the disintegration of the socialist camp, indeed of the Soviet Union itself, 
deprived developing countries of allies151 (although the end of the Cold War 
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the most skeptical opponents to the whole exercise, thus preventing rather than promot-
ing a positive outcome.’ Communication by Guttorm Vik (12 April 2014) (on fĳile with 
the author).
152 The socialist countries were often represented by high-level representatives in the meet-
ings of the Commission. Especially during the late 1980s, this was not only to influence 
the Commission’s discusions, but also to learn more about TNCs and the potential bene-
fĳits they could bring to host countries. At that time, a number of socialist countries began 
to allow joint ventures with TNCs in their territories. Interview with Stephen Pursey and 
Kari Tapiola (8 January 2014).
153 See 1960–1970 – United Nations Development Decade; 1971–1980 - Second United Nations 
Development Decade; 1981–1990 - Third United Nations Development Decade; and 1991–
2000 - Fourth United Nations Development Decade <http://www.un.org/en/events/
observances/decades.shtml> accessed 14 September 2014.
154 As developing countries turned toward export-oriented development strategies, the role 
of TNCs in providing access to international markets became a particularly sought-after 
asset. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export 
Competitiveness (United Nations 2002) and UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: 
Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development (United Nations 2013). 
The phenomenon of global value chains was foreshadowed, under the heading 
‘integrated international production systems’ in UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1993: 
Transnational Corporations and Integrated International Production (UNCTAD 1993).
meant that the East-West aspect of the subject, including the question of the 
defĳinition of TNCs, no longer played a role in the United Nations Code discus-
sions and negotiations).152
The interest situation of the developing countries, too, changed beginning 
in the 1980s. While the oil shock had initially boosted the bargaining power of 
developing countries, there was not, in the end, sufffĳicient solidarity among 
them to make producer cartels work across various natural resources. 
Importantly, the debt crisis, which had started in Mexico in 1982 (and engulfed 
other developing countries as well), put non-debt-creating fĳinance at a pre-
mium and more stable fĳinance (like FDI) to boot. The ‘United Nations 
Development Decades’ had not brought the desired improvements.153 This 
went hand-in-hand with the recognition that FDI brings a bundle of tangible 
and intangible assets that can make an important contribution to a country’s 
development. The change in the development model from import substitution 
to export orientation made attracting FDI especially desirable as it helps 
national economies to link to international markets in a globalizing world 
economy characterized by integrated international production, i.e., global 
value chains.154 A number of the newly industrializing countries in East Asia 
showed the usefulness of attracting FDI and non-equity forms of foreign par-
ticipation. Such investment, therefore, became increasingly sought not only by 
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155 Changes took also place among developed countries, changes that strengthened eco-
nomic cooperation among developed countries, but typically did not include developing 
ones. For example, the members of the European Union launched their Single Market 
Programme in 1993; Canada and the United States concluded a free trade agreement in 
1988; and the NAFTA negotiations started in 1986. Moreover, with the disintegration of the 
socialist camp, a number of central European countries joined the European Union.
156 John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform in Latin American Adjustment: 
How Much Has Happened? (Institute for International Economics 1990) 15.
157 A point particularly emphasized by José E Alvarez; see his ‘The Once and Future Foreign 
Investment Regime’ (n 45). It should be noted that a number of the socialist countries had 
already begun to open their economies to FDI, at least in the form of joint ventures, in 
order to obtain capital and technology.
158 As reflected, eg in the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolutions on entre-
preneurship. See eg A/RES/41/182 (8 December 1986) on ‘Indigenous Entrepreneurs in 
Economic Development’ (adopted without a vote); A/RES/45/188 (21 December 1990) on 
‘Entrepreneurship’ (adopted by vote 138 yes, 1 no (Cuba), 0 abstentions) (its also con-
tained the following preambular paragraph: ‘Welcoming the contribution which the 
United Nations system makes in helping Member States promote entrepreneurship, 
including foreign direct investment, and encouraging the active participation of private 
enterprise, where appropriate’, and it decided to include a sub-item entitled 
‘Entrepreneurship’ in the provisional agenda of the 46th session of the General Assembly); 
and A/RES/46/166 (19 December 1991) on ‘Entrepreneurship’ (adopted without a vote).
159 Even though FDI can bring various tangible and intangible assets and serve as a catalyst 
for domestic development, FDI flows represented only an average of 8% world gross 
indebted developing countries, but also other developing countries and 
economies in transition that did not want to be excluded from the globalizing 
world economy.155 This was further encouraged by the emerging ‘Washington 
consensus’, a plank of which noted that ‘a restrictive attitude limiting the 
entry of foreign direct investment (FDI) is regarded as foolish.’156 At the same 
time, the collapse of the socialist camp during 1989–1992 deprived developing 
countries of an alternative development model centered on central plan-
ning.157 Increasingly, developing countries paid more attention to the impor-
tance of the private sector and entrepreneurship158 and the positive role of 
FDI. The demystifĳication of TNCs and of their impact, as well as the rising 
capacity of developing countries to deal with foreign investors (through 
national regulations, the negotiation of contracts, etc.), facilitated the rap-
prochement between host developing countries and TNCs – and UNCTC’s 
numerous studies and advisory projects contributed their share to this pro-
cess. From being a ‘bad thing’, FDI was more and more seen as a ‘good thing’ 
for development; from being part of the problem, it became part of the 
solution, in fact almost a panacea159 – partly as a result of economic need and 
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domestic capital formation in 2013 (7% for developed countries, 9% for developing coun-
tries, 16% for transition economies, although this share varies greatly by country); see 
UNCTAD (n 146) annex tables. In other words, the development efffort needs to focus pri-
marily on indigenous enterprises.
160 Developing countries did, however, maintain their resistance against a multilateral efffort 
to deal with international investment in the WTO, including because they feared cross-
retaliation in the case of the non-observance of such an agreement.
161 It was estimated that, by the end of the fĳirst decade of the twenty-fĳirst century, some 8,000 
agencies at the national and sub-national levels sought to attract FDI; see Millennium 
Cities Initiative, Handbook for Promoting Foreign Direct Investment in Medium-Size, Low-
Budget Cities in Emerging Markets (Columbia University 2009). The World Association of 
Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) was established in 1995 by UNCTAD’s 
Investment Division, the successor of UNCTC; WAIPA has become the world’s paramount 
association of investment promotion agencies. See <http://www2.waipa.org/cms/Waipa> 
accessed 14 September 2014.
the pressure of reality, and partly as a result of a learning process. All this was 
facilitated by TNCs, which had of course become aware of the developments 
in the OECD and the United Nations, and began to accept the concept of 
‘corporate social responsibility’. A code of conduct for TNCs did not fĳit into 
that landscape.160
The zeitgeist had changed. Toward the middle of the 1980s, the criticism 
of TNCs and their foreign investments had died down, and the overlapping 
self interests between developed and developing countries in a comprehen-
sive instrument had waned. Pressure had ceased. The political will to take 
action had dissipated. If there had been a window of opportunity for a com-
prehensive multilateral instrument dealing with TNCs and FDI, it was open 
at the end of the 1970s and the fĳirst two years of the 1980s. At that time, such 
an instrument was in tune with the zeitgeist. It might have been an instru-
ment  that would have combined, in a balanced manner, guidelines for the 
conduct of TNCs with standards of treatment of foreign investors by host 
country governments, a voluntary instrument, but one that might have had 
a modest implementation mechanisms (which, perhaps, could have been 
strengthened over time). As the 1980s progressed, the window of opportunity – 
if there had indeed been one – closed for a comprehensive United Nations 
Code (and other TNC-related international instruments whose negotiations 
had not been concluded successfully before the mid-1980s), serving as a broad 
basis for a broad-based architecture of the international investment law and 
policy regime.
Instead, red carpet came to replace red tape, rolled out by an exploding 
number of investment promotion agencies at all levels.161 Liberalization 
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162 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development. National and 
International Perspectives (United Nations 2003) xvii.
163 Interview with Peter Hansen (20 January 2014).
164 Communication by Sten Niklasson (9 February 2014) (on fĳile with the author).
165 Communication by Clarke Ellis (who was the de facto head of the United States delega-
tion to ECOSOC during Fall 1974, when that body established the Commission and 
UNCTC; from 1984–1987, he was Director of the Offfĳice of Investment Afffairs in the United 
States Department of State and head of the United States delegation for the Code negotia-
tions) (dated 28 January 2014) (on fĳile with the author).
and protection came to replace the ‘taming’ and control of TNCs: during the 
heyday of liberalization in the 1990s, some 95% of all (1,641)162 national FDI 
policy changes were in the direction of making the investment climate more 
welcoming for foreign investors, and about 1,500 BITs were concluded. 
Furthermore, bilateral and regional international investment negotiations 
moved from protection to liberalization, to facilitate the entry and operations 
of TNCs in host countries.
As Peter Hansen, UNCTC’s last Executive Director, put it: ‘The efffort to nego-
tiate a comprehensive Code of Conduct in the United Nations was ahead of its 
time when it was conceived and negotiated. It was never completed because 
macro-economic and political circumstances changed. But, hopefully, the 
efffort opened the eyes of policy-makers and others about what needs to be 
done in the area of international investment.’163 Echoed Sten Niklasson: ‘It was 
a process of mutual learning among delegations and it pointed the global 
search-light towards certain questionable and murky activities of TNCs. It is 
likely that this international attention triggered self-regulating initiatives in a 
number of TNCs, although the causal connection will remain unclear.’164 And 
similarly Clarke Ellis, the head of the United States delegation for the Code 
negotiations in 1984–1987: the failure of the negotiations ‘does not mean that 
the exercise was worthless. Through discussion, the developing and socialist 
countries came to learn of the benefĳits of foreign investment and the need to 
treat foreign investors fairly. The developed countries learned about the sensi-
tivities of the developing countries and the need for their companies to be 
good corporate citizens.’165
6 Where Do We Stand?
By the end of the 1990s, the position of developed countries on interna-
tional  norms for international investment had prevailed across the board. 
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166 As discussed elsewhere, though, the OECD Guidelines were strengthened in terms of 
their scope, content and implementation, beginning with the review in 2000, revitalizing 
in this manner this instrument.
167 Although the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on 
Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs), negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round, 
are relevant in this context. See Rudolf Adlung, ‘Multilateral Investment Disciplines: 
Don’t Forget the GATS!’ (2014) 117 Columbia FDI Perspectives.
168 See eg the discussion in UNCTAD, ‘Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS)’ IIA Issues Note, No 1 (2013).
169 Latin American countries began abandoning the Calvo Doctrine and accepting investor-
state dispute settlement in their BITs during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Bolivia 
accepted an investor-state dispute-settlement provision 1987 in its BIT with Germany 
(Treaty concerning the promotion and mutual protection of investments (with protocol) 
between Federal Republic of Germany and Bolivia signed at La Paz on 23 March 1987). 
Other countries concluded similar BITs as follows: Uruguay – 1987; Argentina and 
Venezuela – 1990; Chile and Peru – 1991. See Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of 
International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 Intl L & Pol’y 178–179. The fĳirst South 
American countries to sign the ICSID Convention did so in 1991: Argentina, Chile and 
Peru; see <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&a
ctionVal=ShowDocument&language=English> accessed 14 September 2014.
170 Salacuse and Sullivan (n 47) 68.
The question of comprehensive multilateral166 guidelines for TNCs was offf the 
table, as was the question of an international implementation mechanism. On 
the other hand, international investment law had not only been confĳirmed, 
but was more and more supplemented and elaborated through a web of bilat-
eral and regional investment agreements, rather than a multilateral instru-
ment,167 and the decisions of a rising number of arbitration tribunals 
adjudicating investor-state disputes. Fair and equitable treatment and national 
treatment were widely accepted, as was the standard of ‘prompt, adequate and 
efffective compensation’ (and criteria related to it) in the case of nationaliza-
tions, with fair and equitable treatment as an absolute standard becoming an 
important ground for fĳirms initiating investor-state disputes.168 The protection 
of investors through proper treatment under international investment law was 
assured, supported by a functioning investor-state dispute-settlement mecha-
nism (i.e., the Calvo doctrine was abandoned).169 Discussions and negotiations 
moved on to further liberalization.
The change had been dramatic. By the beginning of the 21st century, a strong 
international investment regime had emerged from the ‘ephemeral structure’ 
that Salacuse and Sullivan had noted existed in the mid-1970s.170 To quote 
Thomas W. Wälde:
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171 Thomas W Wälde, ‘Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation and Investment 
Disputes: Competition and Choice as the Path to Quality and Legitimacy’ in Karl P Sauvant 
(ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2008–2009 (OUP 2009) 505, 514.
172 ibid 543.
173 As Joachim Karl argued in ‘The “Spaghetti Bowl” of IIAs: The End of History?’ (2014) 115 
Columbia FDI Perspectives <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/fĳiles/2013/10/No-115-Karl-FINAL 
.pdf> accessed 14 September 2014 borrowing part of the title of F Fukuyama’s volume 
The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press 1992).
174 In 2013, total sales of foreign afffĳiliates amounted to an estimated USD 35 trillion, while 
world exports were USD 23 trillion; see UNCTAD (n 146) 24.
175 Fredriksson (n 1) 8; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011: Non-equity Modes of 
International Production and Development (UNCTAD 2011) web annex table.
Investment treaties…have built, indubitably, one of the most efffective 
and truly legal regimes within the fragmented and mostly quite rudimen-
tary institutional frameworks for the global economy. Comparable in 
terms of legal character and efffectiveness to the WTO regime, the inter-
national investment regime is arguably more advanced, as it fully incor-
porates the most important and directly afffected non-state actors. In a 
longer-term perspective, claimants (and their lawyers), who are essen-
tially driven by private interests, help ensure greater compliance and 
efffectiveness for the treaties and their underlying objectives than can 
or is achieved by exclusively inter-state implementation procedures. 
It also goes beyond the prospective-remedy-only sanction available 
under the WTO.171
He added: ‘Investment arbitration is arguably the most astounding success in 
international law over the past decades…’172 Wälde’s observations may be cor-
rect, at least as seen from the perspective of international investors. But it is 
less clear whether this is also true from the perspective of other stakeholders 
and the international investment regime as a whole.
Is this ‘the end of history’ for the international investment law and policy 
regime?173 It is a regime that covers the most important type of international 
economic transactions: the value of the sales of the foreign afffĳiliates of TNCs is 
higher than the value of world exports.174 The number of TNCs headquartered 
in the developed countries had risen from at least 7,000 in the late 1960s, to at 
least 24,000 as of 1990, to over 70,000 at the end of 2010,175 As to the last number, 
at least 30,000 TNCs headquartered in emerging markets need to be added. 
These over 100,000 TNCs controlled over one million foreign afffĳiliates at the end 
of 2010. Moreover, FDI is (as mentioned earlier) more intrusive than trade, as 
TNCs, by virtue of establishing foreign afffĳiliates, become directly involved in the 
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176 It should be noted that protection is expected to lead to higher FDI flows. There is a lively 
discussion about the extent to which IIAs (and especially BITs) lead to higher FDI flows. 
For a collection of studies on this topic and an evaluation of the evidence see Karl P 
Sauvant and Lisa E Sachs (eds), The Efffect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (OUP 2009).
177 For a brief review of the nature of the international investment regime see Karl P Sauvant 
and Federico Ortino, Improving the International Investment Law and Policy Regime: 
Options for the Future (Ministry of Foreign Afffairs of Finland 2013).
production process and the social fabric of their host countries, increasing (as 
compared to trade) in this manner not only the potential to contribute to the 
development of their host countries, but also to the potential for conflict. At the 
same time, there is no multilateral investment instrument that would provide 
an enforceable over-arching framework applicable to the multi-jurisdictional 
activities of foreign investors, be it to provide stability and predictability for 
their operations or avoid overlapping/underlapping regulatory requirements. 
Rather, the current international investment regime has a light and fragmented 
institutional structure, is shaped by a multiplicity of (mostly bilateral) legal 
sources and has broad subject-matter coverage. Its single most important objec-
tive is the protection of international investment;176 hence standards for the 
treatment of investors by host countries are at the core of the regime, with arbi-
tration as the chosen, and increasingly criticized, mechanism to settle invest-
ment disputes.177
It is the last of these characteristics of the international investment regime – 
the singular and deliberate focus on protection – that distinguishes the current 
regime from that sought in the negotiations of a United Nations Code. That 
Code sought to establish a balance between the rights and responsibilities of 
foreign investors on the one hand, and those of host country governments on 
the other. As discussed, the subsequent developments led to an international 
regime that enshrines the rights of foreign investors vis-à-vis the governments 
of host countries and the mandatory responsibilities of host country govern-
ments concerning the treatment of foreign investors, leaving the rights of host 
country governments (vis-à-vis foreign investors and their foreign afffĳiliates) 
and the responsibilities of foreign investors and their foreign afffĳiliates (vis-à-
vis host countries) aside.
The fĳirst of these imbalances – between the rights of host countries and 
those of foreign investors and their foreign afffĳiliates – has been the subject of 
policy developments since the heydays of investment protection and liberal-
ization in the 1990s. In particular, it has become clear that some key interna-
tional protections, such as fair and equitable treatment, measures tantamount 
to expropriation, need to be defĳined more precisely to avoid being interpreted 
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178 See respectively <http://www.state.gov/s/l> and <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade 
-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-difff/gov.aspx?lang=eng> 
accessed 14 September 2014.
179 See <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf> accessed 14 September 
2014; see also the 2012 United States BIT model <http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/188371.pdf> accessed 14 September 2014. For a comparison of the 1984 and 
2004 US BIT models see Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 
U.S. Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host State Interests’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed) 
Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2008–2009 (OUP 2009) 283–316; 
Alvarez (n 45).
180 Canada took a similar approach; see the 2004 Canadian Model BIT at Article 5 (defĳining 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ as no more than the minimum of that required by custom-
ary international law) and Article 13 (prohibiting the expropriation of covered invest-
ments, ‘except for a public purpose’) <http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA 
-model-en.pdf> accessed 14 September 2014.
181 Trade Promotion Agreement, United States of America – Republic of Peru (signed 12 April 
2006), Article 22.2, -footnote 2, signed on 12 April 2006, p. 22–1, <http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/fĳiles/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset_upload_fĳile841_9542.pdf> 
accessed 29 September 2014.
too broadly. This process was led by the United States and Canada, which had 
become the respondents in three NAFTA chapter 11 arbitration cases each by 
2000, brought by foreign investors against them.178 The United States, tradi-
tionally a strong proponent of investment protection and liberalization, began 
to circumscribe key investor protections, as reflected in its 2004 BIT Model179 
and the treaties based on it, to allow for more national policy space to be able 
to pursue legitimate public policy objectives without running the risk of 
becoming respondents in arbitral cases.180 Moreover, when essential security 
interests are afffected, the United States, and the parties to its agreements con-
taining a self-judging essential security clause, can disregard the protections 
enshrined in newer IIAs. Where this occurs, and a claim is being brought 
against an action taken by the Government of the United States (as well as its 
treaty partners), it is protected, at least to a large extent, by a clarifĳication that, 
if the essential security clause is evoked, ‘the tribunal or panel hearing the mat-
ter shall fĳind that the exception applies.’181
It can be expected that other countries will adopt a similar approach to pro-
tect their national policy space. In fact, it is surprising that most other coun-
tries concluding international investment agreements have not yet emulated 
this approach (and rapidly so) – in the interest of arriving at a diffferent balance 
in the rights of host countries versus those of foreign investors and their for-
eign afffĳiliates. The challenge is of course to fĳind the right balance between the 
predictability that international investors require and the flexibility that host 
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182 Some countries, including China, may also be more interested in the potential reputa-
tional gains of the application of the Guidelines to their outward investors than in the 
application of the Guidelines to foreign investors in their territories. Communication by 
Manfred Schekulin (7 March 2014) (on fĳile with the author).
183 For an example of the voluntary approach, see eg ‘The Global Sullivan Principles’ <http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/sullivanprinciples.html> and ‘Promoting a European 
framework for Corporate Social Responsibility’ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex 
UriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0366:FIN:en:PDF> accessed 29 September 2014. For an example 
of an exchange for an advantage, note that, eg the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
of the United States requires that, for FDI projects to be eligible for its insurance, they 
need to meet certain criteria; see ‘OPIC-supported projects should encourage positive 
host country development efffects’ <http://www.opic.gov/doing-business-us/OPIC-
policies> accessed 29 September 2014. For an example of the mandatory approach, see eg 
the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 USC § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A) (1977) <http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/fcpa-english.pdf> (stating that ‘[i]t shall be 
unlawful for any issuer…, or for any offfĳicer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer
country governments need to protect their own interests – and a self-judging 
essential security clause may go too far in this respect.
The other imbalance – between the responsibilities of foreign investors and 
their foreign afffĳiliates versus those of host countries – is a more difffĳicult mat-
ter, involving, as it does, prescriptions for the conduct of business entities. As 
discussed, the traditional home countries have been skeptical about, if not 
outright against, international guidelines for foreign investors and their for-
eign afffĳiliates, at least if they are mandatory. While developing countries have 
taken the opposite approach in the past, it is quite conceivable that their atti-
tude on this matter may change, as their own fĳirms are becoming important 
foreign investors (see below). As a result, they may no longer be interested in 
binding guidelines for outward investors, but rather prefer voluntary ones. This 
is reflected by the fact that a number of emerging markets have adhered to the 
OECD Guidelines.182 Moreover, as the regulatory and judicial capacities of 
developing countries have become stronger and continue to improve, they are 
in a better position to deal with the negative efffects of FDI and, more generally, 
any objectionable behavior of investors. In other words, they may no longer 
need, at least not as much in the past, the leverage of international agreements 
to deal with undesirable corporate behavior. In addition, home countries 
always have the possibility, at least to a certain extent, to impose unilaterally 
certain requirements on the TNCs outward-investing from their territories, be 
it on a voluntary basis, in exchange for an advantage or in a mandatory manner 
(although this may raise difffĳicult issues related to the extra-territorial applica-
tion of laws).183
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or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offfer, pay-
ment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offfer, gift, promise 
to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to…any foreign offfĳicial for pur-
poses of…(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign offfĳicial in his offfĳicial capacity, 
(ii) inducing such foreign offfĳicial to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty 
of such offfĳicial, or (iii) securing any improper advantage’) accessed 29 September 2014.
184 The question of how far down in the supply chain the responsibility of parent/contract-
ing fĳirms reaches was an important topic in the 2011 OECD Guidelines review. See 
‘Multinational Enterprises: Better Guidelines for Better Lives’ (2011) OECD Observer No 
285 <http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3553/Multinational_enterprises: 
_Better_guidelines_for_better_lives.html> accessed 29 September 2014, summarizing the 
main changes in the 2011 update. See also John Evans, ‘Responsible Business Conduct: 
Re-shaping Global Business’ (2011) 50 Columbia FDI Perspectives; Tadahiro Asami, 
‘Toward the Successful Implementation of the Updated OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ (2012) 56 Columbia FDI Perspective; and Inter-agency Working 
Group on the Private Investment and Job Creation Pillar of the G20 Multi-year Action 
Plan on Development, ‘Promoting standards for responsible investment in value chains’ 
(UNCTAD and others 2011).
185 Contained in the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework”’ (United Nations Human 
Rights Offfĳice of the High Commissioner 2011).
For the status of implementation of the Guiding Principles, see Human Rights Council, 
‘Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’, document A/HRC/26/25 (5 May 2014).
Still, as the importance of TNCs in national economies and international 
economic transactions grows, it can be expected that the pressure for guide-
lines for international investors rises as well – greater (economic) power is likely 
to fuel calls for greater responsibilities, especially if egregious abuses should 
occur, not only in the global network of a given TNC, but also along the supply 
chain of individual TNCs.184 So far, this pressure has translated itself primarily 
into voluntary instruments, be it at the fĳirm level (in the form of various corpo-
rate social responsibility commitments by individual fĳirms), at the regional 
level (see e.g., the revitalized OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) or 
the most recent “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,” endorsed 
by the United Nations’ Human Rights Council in 2011 (box 2).185 But it would 
be surprising if pressures not only continue, if not increase, for binding 
instruments – not, perhaps (as sought be the United Nations Code) in a single 
comprehensive undertaking, but in a series of instruments that, together, cover 
the most important issues relating to the rights and responsibilities of the prin-
cipal commercial actors in the international investment process.
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box 2 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights[*]
To some extent, the Guiding Principles can be seen as a follow-up to some of the 
United Nations Code and OECD Guidelines provisions (with the latter, as discussed 
earlier, closely linked with the United Nations Code). In fact, close interaction 
between the formulation of the Guiding Principles and the 2011 review of the OECD 
Guidelines ensured that the latter are compatible with the former. In the view of 
Manfred Schekulin, moreover, the OECD’s National Contact Points ‘are the closest 
existing thing to, and the best chance for, a properly functioning global implemen-
tation mechanism of the UN Guiding Principles’ [a]. When issuing clarifĳications, 
the OECD’s Investment Committee would of course mainly base itself on the text 
of the OECD Guidelines, but it may use the Guiding Principles as a secondary 
source.
This is not to say that the Guiding Principles (GP) do not have their own mecha-
nisms. To quote John Ruggie, who, as the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General [of the United Nations] on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, steered the process of the preparation 
and adoption of the Guiding Principles: the main tasks of the Working Group on 
the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enter-
prises established by the Human Rights Council ‘are to promote the GPs’ imple-
mentation and dissemination, identify and exchange good practices, help build the 
institutional capacity of developing countries as well as small and medium-sized 
enterprises, and provide further recommendations to the Council. The working 
group will conduct two offfĳicial country visits a year, and also convene an annual 
global forum on business and human rights to examine overall trends and address 
challenges encountered in implementing the GPs. Along with the Offfĳice of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the working group is also expected to play a role 
as the GPs’ guardian, tracking how they are being interpreted by various actors. The 
working group, like the mandate before it, has adopted a multistakeholder approach 
and plans to work with diverse partners in diffferent regions of the world’ [b].
But, as Ruggie pointed out, the Guiding Principles – being, as they are, in a grey 
zone between voluntary and binding - go further: ‘The Human Rights Council 
endorsed several propositions: that corporations have a responsibility to respect 
human rights; that respecting human rights means not infringing on the rights of 
others; and that the way to meet this responsibility is to have a risk-based human 
rights due diligence process. That authoritative statement of what these things 
mean and require made it easier (i) for other standard setting bodies to adopt the 
same principles (e.g., the OECD Guidelines, ISO26000); and (ii) for national author-
ities to adopt elements of the same principles as actual requirements, not just 
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suggestions (export credit agencies have done so, for example; or the United States 
with a mandatory reporting requirement for investors in Myanmar). In the European 
Union, the Commission asked governments to submit national actions plans, which 
in some cases already include legal requirements. That was part of the strategy all 
along. So what we have got is a politically authoritative formula that in some 
instances is becoming hard law. Beyond that, the Guiding Principles of course also 
reafffĳirm the legal obligations of states with regard to business and human rights, 
and spell out in greater detail what this implies. Here, endorsement by the Council 
established a greater authoritative interpretation of existing obligations’ [c].
Interestingly enough, there were further developments in the Human Rights 
Council (in 2014). More specifĳically, Ecuador and South Africa submitted the fĳirst 
draft of a resolution to the Council on 19 June 2014 (signed also by Bolivia, Cuba and 
Venezuela and supported by 20 countries) which, in its fĳinal version, directed the 
Council ‘to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group … whose 
mandate shall be to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regu-
late, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises’ [d]. At the same time, Norway (supported by 22 other 
countries from all regions, including the members of the core group that had led the 
work on business and human rights since the beginning of the Special Representative’s 
mandate) tabled a resolution that, in its fĳinal version, recognized ‘that it may be 
 further considered whether relevant legal frameworks would provide more efffective 
avenues of remedy for afffected individuals and communities’ and requested the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘to continue work to facilitate 
the sharing and exploration of the full range of legal options and practical measures 
to improve access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses’ 
[e]. On 26 June 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted in favor 
of  Ecuador and South Africa’s resolution, as follows: 20 in favor (Algeria, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, 
Venezuela, Vietnam), 14 against (Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom, United States) and 13 abstentions 
(Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives, Mexico, 
Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, United Arab Emirates) [f]. On 27 June 2014, then, 
the Council adopted Norway’s cross-regional resolution by consensus.
Note that the developed countries voted against the Ecuador and South Africa 
resolution, while a number of developing countries abstained. While it remains 
to be seen what will come of these effforts, it seems clear that developed countries 
continue to oppose binding behavioural rules for MNEs. While various non- 
governmental organizations issued supportive statements [g], the International 
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186 The point made by Karl (n 173).
187 For a discussion, see Sauvant and Ortino (n 177).
7 What Could Bring About Change?
What could lead to a more profound change toward a more balanced interna-
tional investment law and policy regime? Short of a catalytic event like the end 
of World War II that had led to the establishment of the Bretton Woods institu-
tions,186 there are many drivers for change.187 They include the realization that, 
Organisation of Employers (IOE) reacted by saying in a statement that it ‘deeply 
regrets’ that the adoption of the Ecuador/South Africa resolution ‘has broken the 
unanimous consensus on business and human rights achieved three years ago with 
the endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’; 
that the vote is ‘a genuine setback’ to the effforts underway to improve human 
rights; and that the Human Rights Council has decided to ‘return to approaches 
which have failed’ in the past and which are ‘diametrically opposed to the goal 
of quickly advancing the implementation’ of the Guiding Principles (bold in the 
original) [h].
[*] For a discussion of this instrument, including its genesis, see John Gerard Ruggie, Just 
Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (Norton and Company 2013). See 
also John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Global Governance and “New Governance Theory”: Lessons from 
Business and Human Rights’ (2014) 20 Global Governance 5–17.
[a] Communication by Manfred Schekulin, 7 March 2014 (on fĳile with the author).
[b] Ruggie (n 173).
[c] Communication by John Ruggie, 8 March 2014 (on fĳile with the author).
[d] Human Rights Council, ‘Elaboration on an International Legally Binding Instrument on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights’ 
Resolution A/HRC/RES/9 (14 July 2014) para 1.
[e] Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises’ Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/22 (15 July 2014) Declarative para 11 and 
para. 7.
[f] See Business and Human Rights Resource Center, UN Humanitarian Council Cessions, 
<http://business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty-pros-and-cons/un-human-rights 
-council-sessions> accessed 6 August 2014. See also the commentary by John Ruggie, ‘Quo 
vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors’ <http://www.ihrb 
.org/commentary/quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-business.html> accessed 5 October 2014.
[g] See <http://business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty/un-human-rights-council 
-sessions> accessed 12 September 2014.
[h] See International Organisation of Employers, ‘Consensus on Business and Human Rights 
is Broken with the Adoption of the Ecuador Initiative’ <http://www.ioe-emp.org/index 
.php?id=1238> accessed 12 September 2014.
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188 All economies not defĳined as ‘developed economies’ in UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Report.
189 See respectively United Nations (n 28) and UNCTAD (n 146) annex table 1.
190 Valentina Vadi, ‘Converging Divergencies: The Rise of Chinese Outward Foreign 
Investment and its Implications for International (Investment) Law’ in Karl P Sauvant 
(ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2011–2012 (OUP 2012) 705–724.
once the regulatory framework for FDI is enabling (and becomes quite similar 
across countries), international investment agreements do not necessarily 
lead to more FDI, given that economic factors are paramount in investment 
decisions; that the expectations of governments regarding the desirability of 
FDI are changing, especially as far as mergers and acquisitions are concerned; 
that the number of treaty-based investment disputes is rising, with potentially 
substantial fĳinancial costs for host countries (both in terms of litigating the 
disputes and paying awards if they loose); and pressures from civil society at 
the national and international levels to arrive at a diffferent international 
framework for international investment, including one that takes sustainable 
development considerations into account.
But none of these factors in and of itself is as important as (1) the rise of 
emerging markets as important FDI home countries; and (2) developed coun-
tries becoming respondents in treaty-based international investment disputes, 
and hence more conscious about their status as host countries.
The rise of emerging market TNCs is indeed impressive. As mentioned ear-
lier, there are now at least 30,000 TNCs headquartered in emerging markets. 
FDI outflows from these economies188 averaged about 2% of a rough annual 
average of USD 50 billion world FDI outflows during 1980–1985, compared to 
39% of USD 1.4 trillion world FDI outflows during 2013.189 In absolute amounts, 
FDI outflows from emerging markets had risen from about USD 1 billion during 
1980–1985, to USD 553 billion in 2013 – the latter fĳigure being more than ten 
times world outflows three decades ago when the United Nations Code nego-
tiations were still in an active phase. Since 2004, outward FDI flows from 
emerging markets have been over USD 100 billion annually. TNCs from these 
countries are now important players in the word FDI market.
As a result, not surprisingly, the interest situation of emerging markets is 
changing as well. Nowhere is this more clearly visible than in the evolution of 
China’s BITs (and China has more of such treaties than any other country, bar 
Germany). While China’s early BITs clearly reflected its position as a host coun-
try (visible in, e.g., the limited application of national treatment and investor-
state dispute settlement and her adamant opposition to pre-establishment 
national treatment),190 the situation has changed profoundly since then, and 
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191 ibid. Or, to quote, Schill, the new generation of China’s BITs (starting with the BIT with 
The Netherlands (2001) and Germany (2003)) ‘conform, despite some remaining limita-
tions, in all major aspects to what can be considered standard treaty practice in approxi-
mately 2,500 BITs world-wide’, turning the country’s BITs ‘into efffective and powerful 
tools of investment protection’. See Stephan W Schill, ‘Tearing Down the Great Wall: The 
New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China’ (2007) 15 Cardozo 
J Intl & Comp L 76–77. See also Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment 
Treaties: Policies and Practice (OUP 2009).
192 Xinhua, 12 July 2013. In making this important policy change, it might well be that internal 
policy considerations – in particular its implications for domestic economic reform – 
were equally important.
193 The 1968 BIT between The Netherlands and Indonesia was the fĳirst such treaty to incor-
porate a provision for investor-state dispute settlement (following the entry into force of 
the ICSID Convention); during the 1990s, this approach became generally adopted. See 
Vandevelde (n 46) 431.
the country’s IIAs have become quite similar to those of the traditional princi-
pal capital exporters.191 If one wanted to pinpoint the precise date at which 
China’s home country interests became equal to, or more important than, its 
host country interests, one might point to 11 July 2013, when China agreed, in 
the context of the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, 
to continue negotiations of a BIT with the United States on the basis of pre-
establishment national treatment and the negative list approach to exceptions 
to such treatment.192 With the rise of China as an outward investor, its interests 
as a host country to protect its policy space have increasingly been comple-
mented by its interests as a home country to protect the investments of her 
fĳirms abroad and facilitate their operations. More generally, with the rise of 
emerging markets as outward investors, the international investment problem-
atique is increasingly loosing the North-South dimension that characterized it 
during the 1970s and 1980s.
At the same time, developed countries have increasingly become respon-
dents in international investment disputes. Investor-state dispute-settlement 
clauses were incorporated as the BITs movement gathered pace193 (concluded 
at that time only between developed and developing countries), because for-
eign investors did not trust the legal systems of developing countries. Moreover, 
it was assumed that only governments of developing countries would be 
respondents, including because there was little outward FDI from these coun-
tries. The situation changed in the 1990s when NAFTA’s dispute-settlement 
mechanism led to a number of disputes that had the United States and Canada 
as respondents. More generally, by the end of 2013 and among developed coun-
tries, only the Czech Republic (20 cases) had a similar cumulative number of 
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194 It should be noted that the United States has not yet lost a case brought against the 
country.
195 Using the OECD country list <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd 
-member-countries.htm> accessed 4 September 2014 and data from UNCTAD (n 168) 
annex 2. Note that the number of disputes may actually be higher; see Luc Eric Peterson, 
‘Analysis: Why it’s Important to Read Between the Lines of UNCTAD’s Annual Review of 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases’ (12 May 2014) Investment Arbitration Reporter 
<http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20140512> accessed 4 September 2014.
disputes in 2013 as the United States194 and Canada; of the 514 treaty-based 
investor-state disputes known at the end of 2012, 120 had an OECD member as 
a respondent.195
This rise of treaty-based investment disputes testifĳies to the usefulness 
(from the point of view of investors) of the dispute-settlement mechanism in 
dealing with alleged treaty violations. It also underlies, as the earlier Wälde 
quote suggests, the strength of the international investment law and policy 
regime. But it puts all treaty partners, including developed countries, on notice 
that they are not immune from disputes and that there are potentially substan-
tial monetary consequences, both in terms of litigating disputes and the 
awards that may be rendered. The fact that developed countries are by far the 
most important host countries for foreign investors, combined with the great 
number of TNCs and their foreign afffĳiliates, as well as applicable BITs and 
other IIAs (and a broad defĳinition of what constitutes an ‘investment’), pro-
vides the basis for a great number of potential disputes (involving of course 
not only governments of developed countries but also developing ones). As a 
consequence, and as mentioned earlier, at least some developed countries (led 
by the United States and Canada) have begun to circumscribe key protections 
enshrined in IIAs to reduce the likelihood that they could become respondents 
in international investor-state disputes. Moreover, it may also be possible that 
more developed countries, as well as emerging markets, will reserve for them-
selves certain interpretive powers of treaties in order to be able to intervene in 
disputes should they arise.
These two developments – the rise of emerging markets as important FDI 
home countries and developed countries becoming respondents in treaty-
based international investment disputes (and hence more conscious about 
their status as host countries) – are the most important current drivers for 
change in the international investment law and policy regime. Reflecting the 
changing interest situations of countries, a new balance between the role of 
international investment law and national regulation in governing the opera-
tions of international investors and their investments is emerging.
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196 This overlap is defĳined primarily by the interest of governments in obtaining access to the 
tangible and intangible assets that TNCs control that are important for economic growth 
and development (with negative efffects being minimized) and the interest of TNCs in the 
locational advantages of host countries. Policies play an important role in enhancing and 
increasing that overlap.
197 See the G-20 ‘Communique’, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
(22–23 February 2014) para 9 <http://www.g20.org/sites/default/fĳiles/g20_resources/
library/Communique%20Meeting%20of%20G20%20Finance%20Ministers%20and%20
Central%20Bank%20Governors%20Sydney%2022-23%20February%202014_0.pdf> 
accessed 29 September 2014, See also George Osborne, Pierre Moscovici and Wolfgang 
Schäuble (respectively Ministers of Finance of the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany), ‘We Are Determined that Multinationals Will Not Avoid Tax’ Letter to the 
Editor, Financial Times (16 February 2013).
In the future, moreover, another driver may become important, a recogni-
tion that was already present at the beginning of the United Nations Code 
efffort, namely that the very global nature of TNCs calls for a multilateral 
approach. While there is certainly substantial overlap between the interests of 
foreign investors and host countries (which is, after all, the basis on which gov-
ernments seek to attract FDI),196 the fundamental interests of TNCs and 
national governments do not always coincide. More specifĳically, although the 
foreign afffĳiliates of individual TNCs are separate legal entities established in 
many jurisdictions, they nevertheless are under the common governance of 
their parent fĳirms – and parent fĳirms seek to maximize their global competi-
tiveness, not the competitiveness of any one of their individual foreign afffĳili-
ates. Governments, on the other hand – be they governments of host or home 
countries – seek to maximize the national benefĳits associated with FDI, i.e., the 
benefĳits that can be realized within their territories. This implies that the 
global operations of fĳirms call for an equally global regime. The fundamental 
diffference in the benefĳits frame of reference regarding the respective objec-
tives of TNCs and governments is likely to become even more pronounced as 
fĳirms become more multinational, i.e., the more their assets are distributed 
across countries.
Therefore, even home countries will increasingly face the dilemma that, 
what is good for, say, GM, Siemens, Lenovo, and Tata is not necessarily 
always good for their respective home countries, the United States, Germany, 
China, and India. The discussions conducted by the OECD and the G20 on how 
to deal with tax avoidance by TNCs indicate that key countries have recog-
nized, at least for one area, that a global phenomenon requires a ‘global 
response’.197
0002252332.INDD   75 1/13/2015   1:55:57 PM
76 Sauvant
the journal of world investment & trade 16 (2015) 11-87
301394
198 Sten Niklasson, communication dated 25 February 2014 (on fĳile with the author).
199 A prime example here is the process that led to the adoption of the ‘Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human Rights’ (n 185). In a broad and extensive program of stakeholder 
8 Lessons Learned
If it is accepted that a global phenomenon requires a global response, and that 
this response needs to reflect the principal interests of all major stakeholders, 
then the fundamental issues that were put on the international agenda some 
40 years ago in the context of the United Nations Code discussions are still 
with us today. If anything, the issues have become more salient, given the 
expansion of the number of TNCs and the considerable growth of FDI. To be 
sure, substantial progress has been made since then, not only in understanding 
the nature and impact of TNCs and their foreign investments, but also through 
a proliferation of various instruments applicable to them. But a comprehen-
sive overarching framework has eluded us so far, a framework governing inter-
national investment as the most important vehicle for bringing goods and 
services to foreign markets and integrating the production systems of individ-
ual economies.
What can we learn from the experience of the United Nations Code negotia-
tions, as well as the negotiations of related instruments, for the establishment 
of such a framework?
To begin with, any efffort to negotiate a comprehensive multilateral instru-
ment that defĳines in a balanced and binding manner the rights and responsi-
bilities of countries and TNCs on all important issues related to international 
investment, contained in a rational structure, requires careful preparation 
before actual negotiations begin. In the words of the Chair of the Working 
Group of the United Nations Code of Conduct: ‘Never launch an initiative of 
this complexity and magnitude without sufffĳiciently long and thorough prepa-
rations.’198 While the lack of such preparations was not decisive for the even-
tual failure of the United Nations Code negotiations (after all, governments had 
largely agreed on the guidelines part of the draft, and they had reached consen-
sus on the OECD, ILO and UNCTAD instruments), it was an issue when it came 
to the more specifĳic and technical treatment provisions. Negotiators need to be 
fully aware of the myriad of difffĳicult technical issues involved, the advantages 
and disadvantages of various trade-offfs, the implications key provisions have 
for their national policy-making, the costs of violating provisions of any agree-
ment, etc., etc. In fact, such a preparatory process would be advisable for the 
negotiation of any international investment instrument, and it must be a pro-
cess that is transparent and involves the range of stakeholders in this area.199
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consultations, support and buy-in were created. This was done through a great number of 
international consultations on all continents. Furthermore, the Special Representative 
and his team visited business operations and local stakeholders in a number of countries. 
In addition, some of the principles were ‘road-tested’ through pilot programmes, for 
example, to establish efffectiveness criteria for non-judicial grievance mechanisms involv-
ing business enterprises and communities.
200 See in this context the failed negotiations within the OECD of a Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment and the so far unsuccessful efffort to deal with international investment in 
the WTO.
201 A consideration that has been important, under the heading of ‘a single undertaking’, in 
WTO negotiations. But see Baldi (n 141) on having too broad an agenda.
202 On the other hand, some issues that bedevilled the United Nations Code negotiations are 
no longer relevant today, eg the question of apartheid in South Africa.
203 Defĳined as FDI that makes a maimum contribution to the economic, social and environ-
mental development of countries and takes place within the framework of fair gover-
nance mechanisms (eg in the case of contracts). For an early efffort to re-orient 
international investment treaties toward sustainability, see the model treaty prepared by 
the International Institute on Sustainable Development: Howard Mann and others, IISD 
Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development (IISD 2006)
Moreover, any efffort of this complexity and magnitude may simply be too 
ambitious an objective in today’s environment.200 To be sure, a comprehen-
sive instrument provides more scope for trade-offfs.201 But it also requires that 
the interests of all principal stakeholders need to be accommodated across a 
wide area of issues. Today, this is more difffĳicult than it was 40 years ago. At that 
time, the principal stakeholders were governments, TNCs and trade unions. 
Today, one needs to add other vested interests, including practitioners of 
international investment law (i.e., the international investment arbitration 
profession), parliamentarians and various non-governmental organizations 
(consisting of countless interest groups that are focused on various aspects of 
the problematique, ranging from groups particularly interested in the develop-
ment impact of FDI to anti-smoking groups). Huge economic and political 
interests are at stake. Reaching consensus is also difffĳicult because new issues 
have arisen since the time the United Nations Code negotiations had begun, 
broadening the scope of negotiations and increasing the complexity of the 
subject matter on which agreement needs to be reached.202 These new issues 
range from such specifĳic matters as abusive treaty shopping or whether state-
owned enterprises need special rules; to the question of where the boundaries 
are of individual fĳirms (especially in regard to supply chains) and the function-
ing of the investor-state dispute-settlement mechanism; to such fundamental 
issues as to whether the purpose of the investment regime requires a reorien-
tation toward sustainable international investment.203
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 <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_handbook.pdf> accessed 29 
September 2014. More recently, UNCTAD has pursued this issue through its Investment 
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development; see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policy (UNCTAD 2012) ch IV.
204 The voluntary World Bank ‘Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment’ 
fĳinalized in 1992, are an example here, see World Bank Report to the Development 
Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 21 September 
1992, published as Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment  
(volume II, Guidelines) (World Bank 1992). This instrument does not contain mecha-
nisms for follow-up or implementation.
205 Specifĳic issues addressed in the United Nations Code later became the subject of separate 
instruments; see eg the earlier mentioned ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework”’ 
(n 185).
206 The Working Group on the Code had 48 members, although others could join. When the 
negotiations moved into the Special Session of the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations, the meetings were formally open to all United Nation members, although 
not many participated actively in the negotiations.
On the other hand, the rapid adoption of the OECD Guidelines, the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration and the UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Set – all 
three negotiated in the shadow of the beginning United Nations Code efffort – 
suggests that it may be easier to focus on specifĳic aspects of the problematique, 
with a manageable agenda – in other words, to negotiate issue-specifĳic instru-
ments, be they focused on treatment issues,204 guidelines or any other aspect 
related to international investment. In such circumstances, a more limited 
range of interests is typically involved, and stakeholders may be more forceful 
and focused in moving the negotiations forward.205 However, all three instru-
ments mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph are voluntary. Moreover, 
the OECD Guidelines were part of a package that involved treatment provi-
sions and were negotiated within a group of like-minded countries. Still, these 
three instruments represent the principal concrete legacy of the United 
Nations Code efffort, apart, of course, from having brought the issue promi-
nently and permanently on the international agenda and having helped to 
clarify many of the key issues involved (which was of use, too, for negotiators 
of subsequent international investment agreements).
Regardless of whether the objective is a comprehensive multilateral or an 
issue-specifĳic instrument, there is the difffĳiculty of obtaining consensus among 
all governments, be it in the United Nations, the WTO or any other global insti-
tution. This is certainly more of a challenge today than 40 years ago, if only 
because the number of governments involved has risen considerably.206 If a 
comprehensive multilateral agreement is deemed too difffĳicult, this raises the 
0002252332.INDD   78 1/13/2015   1:55:58 PM
 79Negotiations of the UN Code of Conduct 
the journal of world investment & trade 16 (2015) 11-87
301394
207 Gary Hufbauer and Sherry Stephenson are among those who advocate a plurilateral 
approach; see their ‘The Case for Case for a Framework Agreement on Investment’ (2014) 
116 Columbia FDI Perspective. They also suggest that such an agreement be negotiated in 
the WTO and that, at one point, the rights enshrined in such an agreement could be 
extended to all WTO members. It would be a plurilateral process that could result in a 
multilateral outcome.
208 In some countries, eg the United States, voluntary instruments, as soft law, can potentially 
be used in courts against fĳirms; see also (n 109).
question of whether a plurilateral or regional approach should be pursued, an 
approach in which a signifĳicant number of committed key players begin nego-
tiations and invite others to join if and when they are ready to do so.207
The OECD, ILO and UNCTAD instruments also show the importance of 
mutual self-interest, pressure that ‘something needs to be done’ and political 
will. As discussed earlier, initially there was considerable pressure on govern-
ments, as well as common self-interest (even if for diffferent reasons) to take 
action when these three instruments were negotiated, creating the political 
will to enter negotiations. But even then, there needs to be sufffĳicient overlap of 
interest between key players in order to move the process forward and to a suc-
cessful conclusion. However, as the United Nations Code negotiations showed 
(which also began under conditions of overlapping interest, pressure and 
political will), it is difffĳicult to maintain political will and overlapping interest 
over time, especially when circumstances change, pressure dissipates and the 
general consensus about the overall objectives of the negotiations (guidelines 
and treatment) is fragile. The iron needs to be struck while it is hot – which was 
done in the case of the instruments mentioned at the beginning of this 
paragraph.
Furthermore, even if an instrument is voluntary, its scope, content, imple-
mentation mechanism, and standing can be strengthened over time. This was 
the case for the OECD Guidelines, through the availability of a clarifĳication 
mechanism, the strengthening of the implementation mechanism, the open-
ing up of the implementation mechanism to other interested parties (such as 
non-governmental organizations), and the expansion of topics covered. In the 
case of the ILO Declaration, an implementation mechanism was agreed upon 
after the original instrument was adopted and cross-references to new instru-
ments negotiated in the framework of the ILO (e.g., on core labor standards) 
were added, expanding the reach of this particular instrument. (In the case of 
the UNCTAD Set, however, these possibilities were not, and could not be, uti-
lized.) While this does not change the voluntary character of an instrument, it 
can make it more efffective.208 Moreover, even voluntary instruments can be 
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209 This was considered in the context of the OECD’s negotiations of a Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (when the proposal was made to annex the OECD Guidelines) and has 
happened, for instance, in the case of a reference to the OECD Guidelines in the Preamble 
of the 2014: ‘Abkommen zwischen der Republik Österreich und der Republik Tadschikistan 
über die Förderung und den Schutz von Investitionen’ stating, ‘MIT DEM AUSDRUCK des 
Glaubens, dass verantwortungsvolles unternehmerisches Handeln wie es in den OECD-
Richtlinien für multinationale Unternehmen enthalten ist, zum wechselseitigen 
Vertrauen zwischen Unternehmen und Gastgeberstaaten beitragen kann.’ See <http://
www.bmwfw.gv.at/Aussenwirtschaft/investitionspolitik/Documents/BGBLA__2012 
_III_18_Text.pdf> accessed 15 September 2014. The recently negotiated BIT between The 
Netherlands and the United Arab Emirates contains a reference to the OECD Guidelines, 
the fĳirst such express reference in a Dutch BIT; see <http://www.loyensloefff.com/en-US/
News/Publications/Newsletters/DubaiNewsflash/Dubai_flash_26nov.pdf> accessed 15 
September 2014. Similarly, the Netherlands-United Arab Emirates BIT (while not yet rati-
fĳied) provides:
‘Article 2: Promotion of Investments: … (3) Each Contracting Party shall promote as 
far as possible and in accordance with their domestic laws the application of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to the extent that is not contrary to their domes-
tic laws.’ See <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0006303/geldigheidsdatum_24-04-2014> 
accessed 15 September 2014.
210 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L 111–203, 124 Stat 
1376 (21 July 2010) Section 1502.
211 OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
afffected and High-risk Areas (2nd edn, OECD 2013). The recent European Commission 
proposal concerning conflict minerals is even more explicitly based on the OECD due 
diligence guidance; see European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Setting up a Union System for Supply Chain due Diligence 
Self-certifĳication of Responsible Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, Their Ores, 
and Gold Originating in Conflict- afffected and High-risk Areas’ COM (2014) 111 fĳinal.
strengthened, e.g., by referring to them in binding international agreements.209 
Finally, standards agreed to at the international level, even if voluntary, can 
become hard law in a national context, as happened, e.g., with the Dodd Frank 
due diligence process provisions on conflict minerals in the United States,210 
which are based on the OECD voluntary due diligence instrument.211 This also 
suggests that, to whatever extent voluntary instruments exist, they should be 
used to the fullest extent possible.
Thus, the availability and strength of an implementation (or follow-up) 
mechanism becomes crucial to making an instrument efffective, as absent such 
a mechanism, a text alone risks becoming worthless. Follow-up can consist of 
a review of an instrument in regular intervals, as in the annual discussions of 
the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the review conferences of the UNCTAD 
Set that takes place every fĳive years. A review can also take place in irregular 
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212 OECD (n 57). The National Contact Points also ‘provide a mediation and conciliation plat-
form for resolving practical issues that may arise’ ibid. Not all national contact points are 
necessarily equally active.
intervals, as in the case of the OECD Guidelines. During reviews, questions can 
be raised and the observance of an instrument can be discussed. The follow-up 
is stronger if a dedicated body has been established with the mandate to clarify 
issues that arise under the instrument, as was done in the case of the OECD 
and (although less efffectively) in the cases of the ILO Tripartite Declaration. 
Moreover, an implementation mechanism can be upgraded over time, as in the 
case of the OECD Guidelines through the strengthening of the role of the 
National Contact Points; among other things, these ‘assist enterprises and their 
stakeholders to take appropriate measures to further the implementation of 
the Guidelines.’212 It was their implementation mechanisms, developed over 
time in the case of the OECD Guidelines, as well as the active work of the ILO 
and UNCTAD secretariats, that made these instruments relatively efffective by 
establishing forums for discussion and creating institutional homes and self-
interest on the part of the organizations involved, including to promote the use 
of the respective instruments.
A crucial ingredient making the voluntary OECD (and ILO) instruments 
relatively efffective was that key constituencies, in these cases particularly 
trade unions, had access to the implementation mechanisms of both organiza-
tions in order to present cases/issues that involved possible violations of what 
had been agreed upon. In the case of the ILO Tripartite Declaration, workers’ 
representatives played the key role. In the case of the OECD Guidelines, the 
majority of cases/issues initially brought for clarifĳication were tabled by trade 
unions (governments did not raise issues that often). Moreover, eventually 
non-governmental organizations obtained access to the OECD’s implementa-
tion mechanism and used this access fully. Non-governmental organizations 
made these two instruments, and especially the OECD Guidelines, ‘living 
instruments’. Hence, access by key stakeholders to the implementation mech-
anism of any voluntary instruments agreed upon is likely to help ensure the 
efffectiveness of these instruments.
It appears appealing to seek to negotiate a binding comprehensive 
multilateral instrument that, in a balanced manner, addresses the rights and 
responsibilities of all major stakeholders on all important issues related to 
international investment, contained in a rational structure. But, absent a cata-
lytic event, a grand design of this nature may be a bridge too far (for the rea-
sons mentioned earlier) in the foreseeable future. The more likely approach to 
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213 See Roel Nieuwenkamp, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on 
Responsible Business Conduct: Soft Law with Hard Consequences’ (2013) Dovenschmidt 
Quarterly 171–175. See also Roel Nieuwenkamp and Kimmo Sinivuori, ‘The Road to 
Responsible Investment Treaties’ Columbia FDI Perspective (forthcoming), as well as the 
examples given earlier (n 209), regarding the references to the OECD Guidelines in BITs. 
For a discussion of the relationship between soft law and international investment law, 
see Andrea Bjorklund and August Reinisch (eds), International Investment Law and Soft 
Law (Edward Elgar 2012), and for the relationship between corporate social responsibility 
commitments and trade and investment rules, Christopher Wilkie, ‘Enhancing Global 
Governance: Corporate Social Responsibility and the International Trade and Investment 
Framework’ in John J Kirton and Michael J Trebilcock (eds), Hard Choices, Soft Law: 
Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (Ashagate 
Publishing 2004) 288–319.
214 ‘In terms of FDI, this means that USD 19 trillion of the USD 23 trillion of global FDI stocks 
(83%) is covered by the OECD Guidelines because the MNEs that own this FDI are based 
in adherents to the Guidelines.’ Communication by Michael Gestrin (24 March 2014) (on 
fĳile with the author).
215 Following Karl Polanyi (The Great Transformation (Beacon Press 1944)), Alvarez suggested 
that the United States 1984 Model BIT might embody the high-point of a liberal laissez-
faire approach to international investment rule making, creating a counter-movement 
toward more balanced IIAs. Alvarez (n 45) 640.
succeed – already successfully pursued at the beginning of the United Nations 
Code negotiations – may be an issue-specifĳic approach, a pragmatic approach 
to seek agreement on aspects of the regulatory framework governing TNCs and 
their activities for which there is shared self-interest, pressure and political 
will, in whatever forum that is most promising. Progress could be sought both 
regarding the treatment and guidelines aspects of a comprehensive regulatory 
framework. Part of such an approach could also be to seek a ‘hardening’ of soft 
law (i.e., voluntary) instruments; the OECD Guidelines are a case in point,213 
covering, as they do, over four-fĳifth of the world’s FDI stock.214 Even if the 
resulting instruments are not perfect, they provide a platform on which further 
agreement can be built, especially if there is a strong implementation mecha-
nism that also provides access to non-governmental groups.
Such an approach can also benefĳit from what appears to be a somewhat 
cyclical nature of rule making regarding international investment, with the 
pendulum swinging sometimes in favor of one type of instrument and at other 
times in favor of another type.215 Thus, during the 1970s and at the beginning of 
the 1980s, the watchword was ‘control’, while during the later 1980s and the 
1990s, the watchwords were ‘liberalization’ at the national level and ‘protec-
tion’ at the international level. Since 2000, national policies have become more 
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nuanced,216 while international instruments consisting of guidelines have 
been strengthened217 and new ones have been added,218 and some interna-
tional investment agreements have become more cautious219 while also aim-
ing for more liberalization.220
Rule making may therefore be haphazard, messy and uneven, depending on 
what is needed and what is feasible in a given constellation of interests and 
forces. But, hopefully, an overall regime is put in place over time that, through 
the combination of various instruments, adds up to a regime that covers, com-
prehensively and in a balanced manner, the various aspects of the range of 
issues related to international investment.
This also applies to the question of whether such rule making should take 
place in a multilateral, plurilateral, regional, or bilateral context – it all depends 
on what is feasible. For example, there is the possibility of a convergence of 
bilateral and regional approaches given that, in 2014, a number of investment 
treaty negotiations were underway (or were considered), involving key devel-
oped and developing countries. At the bilateral level, these included in partic-
ular the negotiations of BITs between China and the United States and between 
China and the European Union; the negotiations between the European Union 
and India and the European Union and Japan; the European Union-United 
States negotiations of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership; and 
the negotiations between India and Japan and India and the United States. At 
the regional level, the most prominent negotiations concern the Trans-Pacifĳic 
Partnership agreement (involving key countries in the Pacifĳic) and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in Asia (involving the 
ASEAN countries, as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and 
the Republic of Korea).221 With some exceptions,222 these negotiations involve 
the principal players in the world FDI market.
216 This is reflected in the number of national policy changes related to FDI that make the 
regulatory framework less welcoming for such investment, as reflected, eg in the creation 
of screening mechanisms for national security purposes.
217 The OECD Guidelines discussed earlier.
218 See eg the ‘Guiding Principles…’(n 185).
219 See eg the changes in the 2004 United States Model BIT discussed in Álvarez (n 45) and 
Vandevelde (n 179).
220 In particular by including pre-establishment commitments.
221 See in this context Schill (n 11).
222 Most notably, Brazil has not ratifĳied any of the BITs it has negotiated, and South Africa has 
virtually stopped negotiating BITs, while terminating some existing ones, and putting in 
place a new domestic regulatory framework; see Xavier Carim, ‘Lessons from South 
Africa’s BITs Review’ (2013) 109 Columbia FDI Perspectives.
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223 Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that a new WTO agenda includes investment. The 
WTO already has a number of instruments bearing on international investment, notably 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) <http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf> accessed 29 September 2014 and the Agreement on Trade-
related Investment Measures (TRIMs) <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ 
18-trims.pdf> accessed 29 September 2014.
In a report to the ICC Research Foundation, released in April 2013, the authors 
observed that ‘the WTO can do useful work preparing the ground for a multilateral frame-
work’ for investment; see Gary Hufbauer and Jefffrey Schott, Payofff from the World Trade 
Agenda 2013 (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2013) 50. Additionally, dur-
ing April 2013, the International Chamber of Commerce adopted during its 2013 World 
Trade Agenda Summit in Doha its ‘Business Priorities’. This agenda included as one of fĳive 
priorities, in a section that looked beyond the WTO Doha Round, the following recom-
mendation: ‘Encourage moving towards a high-standard multilateral framework for inter-
national investment to support economic growth and development, while preserving the 
level of protection provided under existing international agreements’. See ICC, ‘Business 
Priorities’ <http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/1999/
World-business-priorities-for-a-new-round-of-multilateral-trade-negotiations/> accessed 
29 September 2014. Also, the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Trade 
and Foreign Direct Investment released, in June 2013, a report entitled ‘Foreign Direct 
Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment’ (WEF 2013) which, as its title indicates, calls for a multilateral 
agreement on investment. Similarly, the National Foreign Trade Council of the United 
States (a business organization) proposed (according to Inside US Trade, 21 February 
2014, 8) ‘that WTO members negotiate a clear set of investment rules that would apply 
across countries and be less confusing for investors than the “large and growing patch-
work of Bilateral Investment Treaties [BIT]”.’ These statements seem to signal that the 
international business community, a key stakeholder, is in support for a multilateral 
framework for investment, albeit only as far as treatment issues are concerned.
See also Anabel Gonzales, ‘The Rationale for Bringing Investment into the WTO’ in 
Simon J Evenett and Alejandro Jara (eds), Building on Bali: A Work Programme for the WTO 
(Centre for Economic Policy Research 2013) 67–80; Anders Åslund, ‘The World needs a 
Multilateral Investment Agreement’ (2013) Policy Brief No PB13–01. Others argue that a 
multilateral instrument is not likely. See for example Axel Berger, ‘The Futile Debate over 
It can be assumed, at least to a certain extent, that the negotiating parties 
will seek a certain degree of consistency in their various commitments in dif-
ferent instruments (if only because most of them are likely to include a most-
favored-nation clause), providing the basis and a framework for future 
negotiations worldwide. If this were indeed the case, bilateral and regional 
approaches could coalesce in a plurilateral or multilateral regime in at least 
one area, the treatment of international investors and their foreign invest-
ments.223 Particularly important here are the BIT negotiations between China 
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and the United States, as China is the single largest host and home country 
among developing countries, while the United States occupies the same posi-
tion among developed countries. If these two countries should be able to agree 
on a text, even if not ratifĳied in the end, it would be a historic compromise that 
might well provide a template for other negotiations.224
Furthermore, rule making in such a scenario would be incremental, seeking 
not only to do what is needed and feasible, but also building on what has 
already been done. An incremental approach, for its part, could involve a series 
of activities that range from increasing understanding and confĳidence build-
ing, to seeking to identify specifĳic improvements that interested treaty part-
ners could adopt.225 More specifĳically, such activities could include:226
?? ?????????????????????????????????? ???????? ????????????????????? ????????????-
ment of international investment law.
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????-
ment regime’s purpose, how sustainable international investment consider-
ations could be incorporated into international investment agreements, the 
contents of norms (including the question of the extent to which investors 
should assume certain responsibilities), treaty shopping; and procedural 
issues (e.g. (and most importantly), dispute settlement).227
?? ?? ?????????????????????????????????
?? ????????? ?????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
protectionism observatory; a negotiating support facility to help developing 
a Multilateral Framework for Investment’ (2013) 102 Columbia FDI Perspective <http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/fĳiles/2014/01/FDI_102.pdf> accessed 14 September 2014; and Karl (n 173).
224 See Karl P Sauvant and Huiping Chen, ‘A China – US Bilateral Investment Treaty: 
A Template for a Multilateral Framework for Investment?’ (2012) 85 Columbia FDI 
Perspective <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/fĳiles/2014/01/FDI_85.pdf> accessed 14 September 
2014. The same might emerge from the negotiations of the Trans-Pacifĳic Partnership and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership; but since China, as the most impor-
tant home and host country among developing countries, is not party to these negotia-
tions, these negotiations may, in the end, fall short of a global model.
225 It is interesting to note that the preparations of the ‘Guiding Principles for Business and 
Human Rights’ took an incremental approach in the framework of which the Special 
Rapporteur undertook an extensive programme of stakeholder consultations to gather 
support and buy-in (as described earlier).
226 For an elaboration of the following, see Sauvant and Ortino (n 177).
227 Some of this work is already ongoing, in the respective committees of UNCTAD and the 
OECD.
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228 It is encouraging in this respect that the Group of 7, in its June 2014 Summit, had 
announced ‘a new initiative on Strengthening Assistance for Complex Contract 
Negotiations (CONNEX) to provide developing country partners with extended and con-
crete expertise for negotiating complex commercial contracts, focusing initially on the 
extractives sector, and working with existing fora and facilities to avoid duplication’. See 
‘The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration’, European Commission - MEMO/14/402 05/06/. 
Independently of the establishment of such a facility, work on an online portal providing 
governments with information they need when negotiating large-scale contracts is being 
undertaken by the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment at Columbia University 
see <http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/negotiation-support-developing-host-countries> 
accessed 15 September 2014.
229 Such a process could also encourage greater cooperation by the international organiza-
tions already working on investment (UNCTAD, OECD, ICSID, WTO, ASEAN).
230 And, of course, views difffer within each of these groups of stakeholders. In the case of 
NGOs, for example, views range from those that seek an improvement of the regime, to 
those that seek to reorient its purpose fundamentally (especially toward giving central 
importance to sustainable development) to abolishing the investment regime altogether.
countries (and especially the least developed among them) negotiate equi-
table large-scale, complex contracts between them and foreign investors 
(and, in this manner, also reduce the likelihood that disputes arise);228 an 
advisory center on international investment law that would help developing 
countries (and especially the least developed among them) defend them-
selves in international investment disputes (ensuring in this manner that 
they benefĳit as much from the international investment regime as countries 
that are better resourced); and a recourse mechanism for a wider set of 
stakeholders.
Such an incremental process could also identify ‘low-hanging fruits’ (i.e., spe-
cifĳic issues that command broad agreement on the need to tackle them, e.g., 
abusive treaty shopping, frivolous claims) and suggest possible ways to deal 
with them.229
Such a process would have to take into account that, apart from govern-
ments, a number of other stakeholders have a direct interest in the interna-
tional investment regime and would need to be involved in the process. These 
include parliamentarians, the private sector, practitioners, trade unions, none-
governmental organizations, academics, and representatives of international 
and regional intergovernmental organizations dealing with international 
investment.230
The best option would be for one government (or, better yet, a few governments 
from developed and developing countries) or a respected non-governmental 
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organization to initiate such an independent, open-minded, inclusive, informal, 
but structured, multi-stakeholder international investment consensus-build-
ing process – an incremental thought, discussion and confĳidence-building pro-
cess on issues related to improving the international investment regime. The 
G20 could help initiate such a process by encouraging interested countries to 
launch it. One could even explore the possibility of having representatives 
from international organizations (informally?) service this process: after all, 
UNCTAD’s Investment Division has continued UNCTC’s substantial work on 
international investment agreements and, together with the OECD, ICSID, 
WTO, and ASEAN, has profound knowledge and understanding of this subject 
matter. In this context, it is a promising sign that Finland has begun consulta-
tions to launch such an initiative within the framework of the Helsinki Process 
for global governance that it chairs with Tanzania.231
The international investment regime is in constant flux, but its evolution 
does not follow a pre-ordained trajectory.232 It should be helpful that the posi-
tions of key stakeholders – host and home country governments, TNCs – have 
become less confrontational today than they were when the United Nations 
Code negotiations took place. However, the basic challenges that the Code 
negotiators faced remain, namely to bridge the basic interest situations of key 
stakeholders, to reconcile the application of national and international invest-
ment law governing foreign investment and to fĳind the right balance between 
the rights and responsibilities of investors and governments. Improving the 
regime requires great effforts, a considerable amount of time and even more 
patience. And, above all, improvements in the international investment regime 
need to be in the interest of governments, both in their capacity as home and 
host countries, as well as other key stakeholders, to give it the legitimacy and 
robustness that every international regime requires to be viable in the long 
run. The experience gained during, and the lessons learned from, the negotia-
tions of the United Nations Code should be of help in reaching this objective.
231 For information on the Helsinki Process, see <http://helsinkiprocess.fĳi/> accessed  
15 September 2014. It should be recalled that an earlier phase of the Helsinki Process led 
to a major East-West agreement in the 1980s, an agreement that few thought was possible 
at the beginning of the Process and that contributed to the profound changes that subse-
quently took place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This phase of the Helsinki 
Process is spurred by the implications of globalization.
232 On the evolution of the regime, see José E Alvarez and Karl P Sauvant, with Kamil Gerard 
Ahmed and Gabriela P Vizcaíno (eds), The Evolving International Investment Regime: 
Expectations, Realities, Options (OUP 2011).
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